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ABSTRACT
The way that Total Quality Leadership (TQL) is implemented
r is unique to each command implementing it because it must be
tailored to the command. However, some types of problems and
pitfalls are more common than others. This thesis presents a
case study of the implementation of TQL at one Naval Computer
and Telecommunications Activity based on personal interview
and command documentation. The implementation of TQL at this
command is compared with a change process model and analyzed
against it. Recommendations for corrections and alternative
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The United States Navy is implementing Total Quality
Leadership (TQL). The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of
Naval Operations have both published message traffic and
articles in publications like Proceedings magazine to explain
what it is. Most sailors, officer and enlisted, remain
puzzled about exactly what it is that they are to implement.
Even in the midst of this confusion, orders go out to
implement.
On 01 July 91, the Naval Computer and Telecommunications
Command published an instruction, Appendix A, with the stated
purpose of implementing "...policy for TQL within the Naval
Computer and Telecommunications Command (NAVCOMTELCOM) and its
field activities." The instruction requires the field
activities to submit quarterly reports documenting TQL
accomplishments and points out that the current status of
already existing programs and "...other TQL
accomplishments..." is reportable under this new instruction.
Included as an enclosure to the instruction is a "How To
Manual" for TQL. The manual explains TQL terminology,
describes the structure of the TQL organization and the
composition and responsibilities of its components. Prior to
publishing the instruction, most commands under NAVCOMTELCOM
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(NCTC) were already cognizant of the fact that TQL was coming
and some had begun taking action to implement it as best they
could but, with the publishing of this instruction, TQL had
officially come to NCTC.
At the time that the instruction was published, the only
Navy-produced training that was available was the Senior
Leaders Seminar offered at Monterey, CA and Washington, D.C.,
to Flag level and 0-6 (Captain) level officers. Within the
NCTC claimancy, most of the Commanding Officer (CO) and
Executive Officer (XO) billets are 0-5 (Commander) and below.
There were some billets that were classified as 0-6 billets
for NCTC's major ashore establishments but since training of
Flag level and senior Captains at headquarters levels took
priority, NCTC Captains were often unable to obtain seats in
the seminar. As a general rule, the only training available
for anyone was through civilian contractors listed in the
Federal Supply Schedule. Many CONUS (Continental U.S.) NCTC
commands chose that route to learn about TQL and gain
knowledge on how to implement it.
B. OBJECTIVE
This thesis will look at the implementation of TQL at one
NCTC activity and attempt to analyze actual events in the
implementation process with respect to the TQL change process.
As background for this analysis, the intent and potential of
the TQL philosophy and organization will be examined as it
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relates to NCTC activities and the TQL change process will be
studied as it relates to the theory of organizational change.
The case study was developed using command documentation
and 21 personal interviews from an actual NCTC activity.
Personnel participating in the command's TQL organization were
interviewed for approximately one hour each. Each interview
was conducted privately and respondents were guaranteed
anonymity. Interview protocol is provided in Appendix B.
Limiting factors in the research included limited study
time at the command and an inability to return for follow up
study due to limited funds and time. While further study may
have changed the construct of some details, I do not believe
that significant changes would have been made to the overall
analysis.
This thesis will examine the TQL philosophy and
organization in academic terms but assumes the reader has been
exposed to the basic concepts and tools of TQL. My ultimate
goal in writing this thesis is to provide those in command,
who have been unable to obtain formal TQL training or military
case studies for review, with a vehicle for learning and an
aid in the implementation of TQL at their own command.
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II. TQL?
Total Quality Leadership (TQL) is a management philosophy
that uses the tools of Statistical Process Control (SPC) to
improve the quality of the product. That sounds simple and
direct but when it comes to implementing TQL most are not sure
what to do. More importantly, most are not sure why or how
TQL can be applied given our rapidly changing environment.
A. SYSTEMIC CHANGES VS INCREMENTAL CHANGES
Changes are sweeping through the military. Bases are
closing, units are being decommissioned, and budgets and
manning are being reduced dramatically. Our mission is
changing to one in which military units, especially Naval
forces due to their mobility and visibility, must be able to
respond to a variety of situations in a variety of different
ways. Units will be required to work together more and have
the ability to reconstitute forces as required. [Ref 1]
The Navy will and is responding to these systemic changes
by forming task forces to investigate alternatives and
recommend ways of dealing with the changes in order to meet
the new mission. Use of a task force to resolve issues
resulting from systemic change is not TQL [Ref 2:p. 11]. The
use of TQL comes into play after we have dealt with systemic
4
change because TQL is an incremental or evolutionary approach
to process change. TQL is an incremental approach to change
because changes made under TQL are made to steps in a process
only after a systematic and thorough examination of the
individual process as a part of the system. [Ref 3]
After sweeping changes are made to budgets, manpower, and
assets, individual units will still be required to accomplish
their missions but they will have to do it by making the most
of their remaining assets [Ref 4]. In order to do that, a
focus on total quality is required. A total quality effort
involves close examination and evaluation of processes in
order to identify ways to reduce variation in production and,
thus, reduce costs [Ref 5:p. 334]. A total quality effort is
an incremental approach to quality improvement requiring that
personnel involved in the examination of the processes be able
to communicate, interact with one another and make decisions
as a team, and these types of behavior are not the norm in a
bureaucratic organization.
3. THE BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION
Characteristics of a bureaucratic organization are central
control, task specialization, functional grouping and
coordination by means of rules and regulations (Ref 2:p. 6-7].
There are distinct advantages to having these characteristics.
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First, with central control, mission definition and
accomplishment is straightforward because the key
administrative and configuration decisions have already been
made for all units at some central level. Second, task
specialization makes overall performance more predictable and
reliable. Third, grouping people by function or
specialization capitalizes on economies of scale and permits
greater diffusion of innovations within the specialty.
Lastly, coordinating work through rules and regulations means
that decisions all have the same decision base and values,
therefore, we all tend to perform and think, basically, in the
same predictable manner and face to face communication is not
required in order to accomplish the mission. [Ref 2:p. 6-7]
These advantages are what makes the military organization
successful during war time. Centralized control means that
fewer decisions are required on the front lines and mission
accomplishment can be concentrated on. Grouping by function
enables the diffusion of experience in battle. Task
specialization enables the organization's regeneration due to
catastrophe. And rules and regulations enable us to
understand how units will coordinate with one another even
without face to face contact. [Ref 2:p. 6-7)
Disadvantages of the bureaucratic organization include
underdeveloped face to face communication skills, poor
interaction and communication across functional boundaries due
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to rivalries, assumptions and beliefs about other groups, and
limited group problem solving skills. [Ref 2:p. 7-9]
Despite the disadvantages of a bureaucratic system, we
want to keep our current organizational structure because of
its inherent advantages in achieving the fundamental military
mission. However, we need to overcome its disadvantages in
order to instill total quality into the organLLzation and
improve process efficiency. The TQL organization creates a
bounded time and space for the learning of face to face
communication skills, functional group interaction and group
problem solving skill development so that continuous process
improvement using Statistical Process Control (SPC) can become
a way of life.
C. THE TQL ORGANIZATION
The best explanation of what TQL is and how it is supposed
to work may be provided by an example of how it could be
applied in a Naval Communications environment.
1. Executive Steering Committee
The Executive Steering Committee (ESC) is formed to
provide the focus for the organization and develop strategic
plans. Its membership is comprised of key members of the
command who would be expected to be a part of strategic
planning for the command [Ref 6:p. 5]. At a Naval Computer
and Telecommunications Station (NCTS) membership might include
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the CO, XO, all Department Heads and Officers-in-Charge (OIC),
and the Command Master Chief Petty Officer (MCPO).
One of the first things that the ESC must develop to
provide the focus for the command is the command mission
statement. A good mission statement is something that can be
clearly understood and related to by all members of the
command [Ref 6:p. 10]. Since a mission statement is supposed
to provide command members with a guiding vision, it should
also be one that is easily remembered and referred to [Ref
7:p. 119]. A mission statement alone, however, may not be
enough to help guide the actions of command members,
especially in terms of decisions that impact on the command's
future. The ESC should also develop a vision statement and
guiding principles to further define and support the mission
statement. A vision statement defines what the command will
look like in the future [Ref 8]. Guiding principles add value
to the mission and vision statements and help personnel to
identify with them [Ref 7:p. 104].
With this complete package, all decisions can be made
with the confidence that they are being made in full support
of the command's mission regardless of the type of decision
and who is making it. This doesn't mean that a Third Class
Petty Officer would be capable of making command decisions.
It does mean that a Third Class Petty Officer who understands
and remembers the command's mission statement is more likely
to make decisions while on watch that are more likely to be in
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concert with the command's stated mission and guiding
principles.
At an NCTS, the mission statement might be something
like this:
To provide rapid, reliable and secure communications and
information processing systems to our customers by:
" fostering teamwork within our organization and with our
customers.
* maintaining our equipment and personnel in a high state of
readiness.
" enhancing the quality of the lives of our sailors.
A vision statement could be incorporated into the
mission statement or it could stand alone. A vision statement
could read like this:
To provide our customers with one source for all their
communications and information system needs through
technological integration.
To support the above mission and vision statements,
the ESC could develop guiding principles like the following:
* We are committed to developing our customers'
understanding of the capabilities of the Navy's
Communication System so that they may gain maximum
benefits from its use and the highest quality product
possible.
* We will treat our customers and each other with courtesy
and respect. Our aim is to build an attitude of service
and a reputation for excellence.
* We believe that our equipment are tools that enable us to
provide a quality product and are committed to providing
the best tools possible to meet our customers' needs
through a quality oriented preventative maintenance
system.
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" We are committed to improving message production processes
and capabilities in order to ensure reliable
communications for our customers.
" We are committed to developing our personnel to the
highest extent possible by providing education and
training.
" We recognize that shift work can be difficult on our
sailors and their families and are committed to balancing
off-shift duty requirements against the needs of the Navy
and the best interests of our sailors.
With this kind of guidance, an RM3 on watch in the
Message Center could readily determine what course of action
to take when messages on a customer's diskette are formatted
incorrectly because the command's focus toward the customer
would be clear. The supervisor would clearly understand the
importance of providing education to the customer to prevent
continued suboptimal use of the system. And the Division
Officer would know the importance of working with customers to
set up a mechanism for continuous customer training to fill
information gaps created by normal personnel rotations. Each
individual in the chain of command would understand clearly
how their actions support the command's mission.
The ESC's responsibilities also include developing the
strategic implementation plans for TQL [Ref 9:p. 43]. Many
factors must be considered in the implementation of TQL. Some
of these center on tailoring the structure of the TQL
organization to the individual command, personnel training
sequence, conflict resolution guidelines and participation
requirements. Their role in process improvement focuses on
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interaction with the customer to determine the customer's
needs and then translate those needs to set specification
limits.
To set the stage for further explanation, the database
in a Limited Digital Message Exchange (LDMX) at an NCTS
provides the communication system with constant on-line
routing information for all naval ships and activities and
other customers. Although routing changes can be made
throughout the day on a temporary basis, at new radio day
changes and updates must be incorporated in the database on a
more permanent basis. Often there are problems with this
update. Sometimes errors or other problems cause the run to
be late causing updates to be late. This may not sound like
much but getting message traffic to ships at sea is often
critical to the safety of the ship or security of our nation
and if the routing for that message traffic is not correct
then delivery of the messages may not be as timely as
necessary. Since the routing of messages is affected by the
update, the update itself is considered critical.
Specification limits would be set by the ESC working
with the customer to identify acceptable limits on the quality
of the product. ESC members would sit down with the customer
and determine what the customer needs from the process. Those
needs would then be translated into specifications of
acceptable quality for a process [Ref 6:p. 5]. The most
obvious customer in our NCTS/LDMX database case would probably
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be ships at sea but a less obvious customer might be the
Command VDT operator who is depending on the database update
to formalize local changes made earlier. A significant
stakeholder in the correctness and timeliness of the process
is the Service Clerk, who must redirect (redirect translates
to rework) messages for ships whose updates were not done on
time or done correctly. These are the types of internal and
external customers from whom information would be obtained by
the ESC to set customer specification limits. In this case,
it might be more appropriate for the ESC to work with external
customers and the Quality Management Boards (QMBs) to work
with internal customers.
D. THE QUALITY MANAGEMENT BOARDS AND PROCESS ACTION TEAMS
1. QMB Responsibilities
The QMBs are comprised of the owners of the processes
that produce a product. Their function is to identify those
processes that are critical to the production of a quality
product. Once they've identified those critical processes,
they must determine which process to study in order to begin
improving the quality of the product. Once those decisions
are made they must also determine how to measure improvement
of quality in the product so that the effectiveness of actions
taken on the process can be judged. [Ref 6:p. 6]
One of the first steps in our LDMX database case would
be to set up the QMB. The membership of a QMB owning the
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process for updating the database might be comprised of the
LDMX Officer, the Computer Center Supervisor, the system's
Technical Representative, the Senior Communications Watch
Officer (CWO), the Message Center Officer, and the Operations
Officer. The QMB would first identify all of the steps
involved in the update process and then identify those steps
or factors that are critical to the correctness and timeliness
of an update. Errors in the update or excessive time to
complete the update is recognized as symptomatic of underlying
causes that are either the result of a significant event or
are inherent in the system.
2. QMB Interaction With PATs
The QMB must select individuals to serve on a Process
Action Team (PAT) that will collect the data relevant to an
identified critical process that will be the basis for
decision making [Ref 6:p. 6). The QMB and PAT members work
together to identify variables in the process that can have
the greatest effect on quality. Before the PAT can be sent
out to collect data, the QMB must specify ground rules for
interpreting data collected, identify time limits on the PAT's
existence, set customer specification limits or other
necessary bounds. This information could be provided to the
PAT as a part of the PAT's charter. The PAT then begins the
collection of process data, the data is summarized to present
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the current status of the process and that information is
presented to the QMB by the PAT. [Ref 6:p. 11]
To apply this to our LDMX database, a PAT is appointed
by the QMB to monitor the critical steps in the update process
and is formed by personnel who actually perform updates or
otherwise have a role in the critical steps. Candidates for
the update PAT might include the computer operators, command
VDT operators, service clerks, and CWOs. The PAT would be
provided with a charter that specifically directs how data is
to be interpreted and presented. In other words, the charter
might specify that a specific number of repetitions of a
certain type of error in the update run (compiling and sorting
by the LDMX) should be considered significant and should be
reported or that failure to pick up individual unit's
database changes for certain types of reasons should be
reported. Those steps critical to the process would be
monitored by the members of the update PAT to yield data from
which initial process status is determined. Once data is
collected the update PAT can present the data in accordance
with the guidelines provided in their charter to the QMB.
3. Data Collection
The data collected will indicate whether the process
is in statistical control or not. This means that the process
is predictable or it is not. A process is predictable when
variations in the factors determining quality are within
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control limits. The process is unpredictable when variations
fall outside of control limits. Control limits for all
factors are set at plus or minus three sigma deviations from
the mean by statistical convention [Ref 5:p. 318-321]. The
evaluation procedure for determing the status of a process is
illustrated in Figure 2.1.
DATA REFLECTS PROCESS
IS
Predictable: Variations Unpredictable: Variations
are within Control Limits are Outside Control Limits
but but
Variations are Variations are Variations are Variations are
Within Outside of Within Outside of
Specifications Specifications Specifications Specifications
Responsibility Responsibility Proceu in
to Correct to Correct Chaos
or Improve Process Lies Management and
Process Lies Primarily with Workers must
with Management Workers Stabilia Process
Together
Figure 2.1 Determining Process Status [Adapted from Ref 5)
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a. Process Not in Statistical Control
If the process is not predictable, variations are
a result of special causes or significant events. Variations
in the factors determining quality may be within customer
specifications (as determined by the ESC and the customer and
translated into specifications by the ESC and the QMB) or not.
Even if variations are within customer specifications, special
causes of problems must be removed so that the process can be
brought back within statistical control or made predictable
before attempts can be made to improve the system. PATs or
personnel otherwise involved in the process are usually
capable of removing special causes. [Ref 5 :p. 309-324]
If the process is not statistically predictable
and variations are also not within customer specifications,
the process is in a state of chaos and both management and
workers must work together to bring the process under
statistical control by first eliminating special causes to
problems. Removal of the special causes of variation only
brings the process back into statistical control. [Ref 5:p.
309-324]
b. Process Within Statistical Control
Once the process is predictable, it is
management's responsibility to correct or continually improve
the process. The difference between correcting the process and
16
continually improving the process is significant as this
entails meeting or bettering customer specification limits.
If the process is predictable and variations in the product
fall outside of specification limits defined by the customer,
then the process requires correction. Correction of the
process implies correction of a problem and that correction is
management's responsibility because these types of problems
are attributable to the process. The QMB must systematically
identify steps in the process for improvement and following
the Plan-Do-Check-Act Cycle (PDCA), as explained in Figure
2.2, implement changes to reduce variations. [Ref 5:
p. 309-324]
When the process is predictable and variations
fall inside of specification limits then continuous
improvement is called for. The QMB must determine the
potential for improvement in the process and tighten
specifications accordingly. Continuous monitoring over time
may reveal patterns or trends that indicate areas for
improvement and continued application of the PDCA Cycle. [Ref
5:p. 309-324]
c. Data Analysis
The intent of all this statistical monitoring is
to reduce variations in the end product caused by special or
significant events and then reduce variations caused by things




--Identify what is to be improved
--Plan what changes might lead to improvements
--Decide what data are needed
--Determine how, when , and by whom data will be
collected
DO PHASE:
--Gather baseline data to determine where we are
--Make planned changes
--Gather data to determine what happened after the
changes
CHECK PHASE:
--Determine whether changes led to improvements
--Compare results of changes with what was planned
ACT PHASE:
--Determine which changes should be implemented
--Make the appropriate changes
--Educate the work force to the changes
--Assess application to other parts of the organization
Figure 2.2 The Plan-Do-Check-Act Cycle
[Adapted from Ref 10]
and formatting the data collected and presenting it to the QMB
once a significant amount of data is collected in accordance
with PAT's charter. [Ref 6:p. 6-7]
In our LDMX/database case, any update requiring
time outside of upper or lower control limits, as set by a
three sigma deviation from the mean, is examined by the update
PAT for the special cause behind its variation. One type of
special cause may be late receipt of updates from the Master
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Database (a crucial element in the update process). While
this special cause would not be within the update PAT's
authority to correct, other special causes would be. Those
within the update PAT's authority would, of course, be
corrected and monitoring would continue. As special causes
are removed, the process becomes predictable and compliance
with customer specifications can begin to take priority.
Variations in the update process are examined to
see if the variations are within customer specifications. If
variations are not within customer specifications, the QMB
must examine the process more closely. At this point,
variations are caused by the system and only close study of
the system will reveal areas for improvement. [Ref 6]
The data collected by the update PAT could reflect
variations occurring at one particular step in the process.
It could be that local changes to the data base are not being
incorporated into the updates consistently. How those local
changes are entered into the update run would need to be
examined for potential improvements and monitored through
further data collection. When the data reflects the cause of
the problem over time, a change can be instituted to correct
the cause of the problem. The cause could be a simple flaw in
the Standard Operating Procedure such as who the local change
is passed to for incorporation into the update run once it is
made at the Command VDT. With a simplification in the flow of
the paperwork, the update process could become more accurate
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and efficient and if further data collected reflects a
reduction in variation then it is appropriate to modify the
process formally to make the change permanent. Standard
Operating Procedures for the update could be changed and Job
Qualification Requirements for the update task modified to
reflect the different procedures.
Even if variations are within the customer
specifications, data collected by the update PAT may reflect
trends or patterns in the variation over time that might
signify an area that could be improved in the process. Care
must be taken, however, to not change a process without good
reason and good reasons are those that have a foundation in
data rather than intuition. [Ref 5:p. 317-320]
Improvements to the process do not stop with one
improvement or just because the process meets customer
specification, the update PAT continues to collect data and
the QMB and the update PAT continues to look for trends or
patterns in the statistical data signifying other common
causes to variations in update times. As variations in update
times are reduced, specifications can be reduced. Data
collection is continued and the improvement process continues.
At this point it should be apparent that
communication, work group interaction and teamwork are
necessary within the ESC, the QMB, the PAT. It is top
management's responsibility to nurture an atmosphere conducive
to the development of communication, cooperation, and teamwork
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within the TQL organization and provide leadership so that
improvement efforts are supported throughout the command.
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III. THE CHANGE PROCESS
A. STEPS IN THE CHANGE PROCESS
Just because an organization needs to change doesn't mean
that the change process will automatically begin [Ref 7:
p. 2-4]. The change process is actually triggered when top
management makes the decision to cope with uncertainty by
managing change [Ref ll:p 150]. The change process is a
critical path leading towards developing a cycle of
commitment, coordination and competence. Steps in the change
process are as follows:
1. Mobilize commitment through joint diagnosis of current
situation.
2. Develop a shared vision.
3. Foster consensus for the vision, skills to build it
and constancy of purpose.
4. Spread revitalization throughout the organization
without directing it.
5. Institutionalize revitalization.
6. Monitor revitalization efforts and adjust strategy as
needed. [Ref 12]
B. PARALLEL LEARNING STRUCTURES: A MECHANISM FOR MANAGING THE
CHANGE PROCESS
A parallel learning structure is one mechanism that can be
used to manage the steps in the change process outlined above.
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A parallel learning structure is a separate organization that
is a microcosm of the primary organization functioning in
parallel with the primary organization [Ref 2:p. 121]. It
consists of a steering committee, small groups with their own
norms and operating procedures (culture), and a climate
conducive to innovation, learning and problem solving. The
purpose of a parallel learning structure is to provide a
bounded time and space to observe, exercise and learn new
behaviors. As the parallel learning structure is linked to
the primary organization, use of the new behaviors in the
primary organization begins to occur thus transforming the
primary organization. [Ref 2:p. 9-12]
1. TQL as a Parallel Learning Structure
The TQL organization is a microcosm of the command
organization and is designed to operate in parallel with the
command's organization. It is not designed to replace or
supplant the command organization. The TQL organization
consists of an ESC, QMBs, and PATs representing collateral
levels in the command organization. It is important that each
of these groups within the TQL organization develop their own
identity, operating procedures and norms because they will
have to support a climate that is different from that of the
command [Ref 2: p. 49]. The desired climate is conducive to
resolving problems in previously untried ways (innovation),
learning new skills (interaction and communication, group
23
decision making or teamwork, and Statistical Process Control
(SPC) based decision making skills), and their purpose for
existing is to improve quality by reducing variation or
problem solving.
C. MANAGING CHANGE USING TQL
1. Mobilize Commitment Through Joint Diagnosis of Current
Situation
The ESC is the group that is responsible for strategic
planning [Ref 9:p. 43]. The first logical step in strategic
planning for any organization is to assess the current
situation. What is happening? What forces are demanding
change? How do those demands effect the organization?
Answering these types of questions as a group will give the
members of the ESC a common understanding of their
organization's current situation. Building of the common
understanding as a group builds commitment to the analysis
[Ref 12]. As a core group, the ESC develops the recognition
of the need for change and becomes committed to seeing the
change process through, Critical Mass is achieved. Critical
Mass is required before proceeding in the change process.
[Ref 5:p. 86]
2. Developing a Shared Vision
A vision statement defines what an organization will
look like in the future and has guiding principles to support
and further define it [Ref 8]. An organization's vision
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statement and guiding principles are developed by the ESC as
a group. Again, by developing the statement and principles as
a group, commitment to the statement and principles are built
[Ref 2:p. 114]. Commitment to the vision and its principles
are necessary if top management is expected to support them,
teach them and lead by them.
3. Foster Consensus for the Vision, Skills to Build it
and Constancy of Purpose
It is at this point that the remainder of the parallel
organization can be developed and roles defined. The TQL
organization should have a stated purpose for existing so that
all understand the reason for its existence and members of the
TQL organization can fully appreciate their own roles in the
organization. [Ref 2:p. 127]
Just creating a parallel TQL organization does not
mean that it will function as intended. New skills or
competencies need to be developed to make it work. The new
competencies that will be needed include communication, the
ability to interact, and group decision making skills to
facilitate teamwork [Ref 2]. Developing teamwork is essential
to the development and use of SPC or Profound Knowledge [Ref
5]. Communication and team building skills will help break
down barriers that are a result of rivalries stemming from
functional grouping and task specialization [Ref 2:p. 54].
Development of Profound Knowledge is the basis for future
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decision making by the groups within the organization and,
therefore, basic to their purpose.
Management is required to support the parallel
organization because participation in TQL will require time
for training for the new skills, time to learn how to apply
them, and time to apply them in the group setting. Because
the members of the TQL organization will be learning to apply
skills that are not accepted within the command organization,
support will also be needed in the form of encouragement and
sometimes intervention between the command organization and
the TQL organization [Ref 2:p. 50-52]. When TQL is in the
early stages of implementation, management will need to
provide guidance in the application of TQL. Initial projects
should be small, time bounded, and fairly certain of success
[Ref 9:p. 52-53]. This will increase the probability that the
primary benefit from these projects will be learning to use
the new skills and procedures in problem solving [Ref 2].
Management will need to ensure that successes from these
projects are very visible to provide encouragement to
participants and to help in overcoming skepticism in the
organization.
4. Spread Revitalization Throughout the Organization
Without Directing It
Just as top management's commitment was developed
through participation in the diagnosis of the current
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situation and through participation in the development of the
vision, commitment to TQL must be developed in each
department. Membership in each department must develop their
own understanding of how they fit into TQL and how TQL fits
into their department. Because understanding cannot be
directed, each department must struggle on their own to come
to the understanding. In other words, top management should
not direct how the TQL organization will be used in any
particular department only that it be used and the use will
force the learning of the new behaviors. Top management
should not direct how SPC should be applied but that decisions
must be supported by data thus forcing Profound Knowledge to
be learned through use at all levels within the organization.
Each department can then come to grips with the actual
application on their own.
5. Institutionalize Revitalization
As TQL is applied, the organization will be forced to
examine the roles of personnel and internal structures and
systems. Management must be open to re-examining, and
modifying or altering the command's organization to make
support for change more permanent [Ref 2]. In order to stop
supporting the belief that quality can be inspected into the
production of a product, management may have to direct that
mass inspection will cease and work with Quality Assurance
Divisions to redefine their role in the production process.
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New policies may need to be developed such as eliminating the
practice of awarding contracts solely on the basis of price
and new criteria for awarding of contracts developed.
Leadership will need to be instituted in the place of
meaningless slogans and work quotas. [Ref 5]
6. Monitor Revitalization Efforts and Adjust Strategy as
Needed
Top management cannot just put the TQL organization in
place, support it and expect things to continue without
change. Use of the TQL organization will cause behaviors
inside of the TQL organization to change and as linkage
between the TQL organization and the command organization
occurs, behaviors within the command organization will begin
to change [Ref 2]. Top management must constantly and forever
evaluate progress and make changes to the implementation
strategy as the organization adapts [Ref 12]. This should
be done by the ESC in order to maintain a high level of
commitment to the evolving strategy for continuous
improvement.
D. THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN THE TQL CHANGE PROCESS
With TQL, top management of the command organization are
obliged, as they have always been obliged, to provide
leadership to the command and, now, to the parallel structure
they have created. They must demonstrate commitment to the
new structure and its purpose. It is not enough to just mouth
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the words. Commitment must be genuine and visible because top
management must be able to drive out fear from the
organization, in particular, fear of reprisal and fear of
failure [Ref 2:p. 134-135]. Interaction between functional
groups must be required in order to break down barriers
between departments [Ref 2:p. 140]. The use of new
competencies must be rewarded in order to build an acceptance
and eventually a requirement for their continued use [Ref 12].
Top management must be able to provide support in the form of
resources for the TQL change effort [Ref 2]. This will
require funds for training, time, and people in a period when
all are in short supply. It will be necessary to exercise
leadership so that these are understood to be investments in
the organization's future [Ref 5].
Most commands have seen change programs come and go
building more skepticism with each failure. Few have seen a
successfully managed change program and the biggest impediment
to change is what we have learned before about change [Ref
2:p. 142]. In order to overcome this skepticism built over
the years, top management must establish its credibility and,
in order to do so, they must adopt the new philosophy,
behaviors, and competencies as their own. By embracing them
as their own and using them, they will be able to recognize
them in others and reward and promote those who have also
adopted the philosophy and the behaviors and who use the
competencies. [Ref 12]
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Lastly, top management must understand that changes in the
organization will take time. Expectations that are too high
will create problems by pushing the parallel structure, and
the command, too quickly toward changes to which they are not
committed. Few people, top managers included, are able to
imagine things that they have not already experienced [Ref
2:p. 142]. If, however, top management adopts and applies the
philosophy, the behaviors and the competencies as their own,
they will be better able to envision how they can be applied
and expectations will be more realistic. This understanding
leads to greater commitment.
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IV. NCTS CONUS
Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station (NCTS) CONUS
came into being with the merger of the Naval Communication
Station (NCS), CONUS and the Naval Regional Data Automation
Center (NARDAC), CONUS in October 1990. With rapid changes in
both telecommunications 3nd automated information systems
bringing the two technologies closer together in function, the
marriage of the two commands was a logical evolutionary step.
Combining the two commands would allow for the initiation of
certain efficiencies. One such efficiency was a manpower
reduction achieved by eliminating functional billets common
to both commands.
The most obviously common billets to both commands were
those of Commanding Officer (CO) and Executive Officer (XO).
NCS CONUS had been traditionally structured with a CO and XO.
The NARDAC had a CO and the second in command was called a
Technical Director (TD). Both command suites had special
assistants and subordinate Department Heads. With the merger,
the new CO of the NARDAC became the CO of the NCTS and the
former NCS CO became the new command's XO. The TD retained a
position comparable to his previous billet while the NCS XO
became a department head. Figure 4.1 reflects the structure
of the new command.
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Figure 4.1 NCTS CONUS Command Structure
A. DIFFERING MISSIONS
The new structure reflected a functional split in the
organization that remained as a lingering reminder of the
differing missions of the NARDAC and the NCS. The NCS was
responsible for providing telecommunications services to ships
afloat, aircraft aloft, and commands ashore. The NARDAC sold
batch processing services, information systems technological
expertise, and information systems management expertise
primarily to ashore commands. No apparent effort was made to
merge the missions of the two commands or to help management
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and supervisory personnel in both commands understand and
accept the merger as a merger of technologies and missions
vice a cost/manpower reducing measure:
We're tactical over here (at the old NCS). We don't
make money. (The) Projects looked at first are ones that
make money.
(There's a) major conflict. It's missions. One side
of the house is worried about lives and the other side is
worried about money.... There are a lot of issues and
animosity with the merger. One side of house feels
absorbed. All the rules and regulations changed to
reflect what the other side was doing. My own point of
view is not so great.... We're (military members) looked
on as free labor.
The command remained, in effect, two different commands with
two different missions required to share a single
Administrative Department, Facilities Department and Command
Suite.
B. FUNDING DIFFERENCES
Within NCTS CONUS there existed two different methods for
funding operations. The NCS had been mission funded whereas
the NARDAC was required to use the NIF or Navy Industrial
Funds accounting method. The NCTS applied both funding
accounting methods.
1. Mission Funding vs. NIF
Under mission funding, a command is just given a lump
sum of money for operating expenses. The general rule of
thumb under this type of accounting is to simply spend all
funds provided. While that may sound wasteful and had no
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doubt been in the past, recent lump sums provided for
operations had fallen well below desired figures forcing
cutbacks and efficiencies. Under NIF, an activity must "sell"
its services to another command or activity and charge enough
for those services to cover costs incurred. Essentially, jobs
are costed according to material and labor required,
therefore, any personnel time not spent in revenue producing
activities is considered revenue lost. The goal under NIF is
not necessarily to make a profit but to break even.
Theoretically, this requires a more businesslike approach to
the management of funds.
With the merger, both funding methods were used
depending on the department or activity funded. Those
departments that had come from the NARDAC and were under the
TD's control remained NIF funded. In the XO's charge were two
departments from the NCS that used a mix of NIF and mission
funding and one department's funding remained mission
oriented. While on the surface this may not appear to present
itself as a problem, it did lead to some resentment.
2. The Effects of the Different Accounting Methods
Some personnel in the mission funded departments,
primarily manned by military personnel from the old NCS and
located in Building 506, came to feel that they were seen only
as free labor for the NIF departments:
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We're all one command but that's a misnomer. It's 'Us
vs Them' philosophy as far as funding. It means the
military gets jerked around and we do the manual labor.
It all stems from how people get paid. They're
(Building 919) run like a business and you try not to run
in the red. Ideally, they're supposed to have zero bottom
line. This past year, we (NCTS) were one of few (NCTS
activities) that made money and everyone else is seriously
in debt. They're NIF and we're OM&N. On the other side
of the street (Building 919), the people charge for
everything they do but if they use us they get value for
our service but we can't charge them. For example, the
second deck at NAVSUPCENTER (Naval Supply Center) needed
rehab and it belonged to NARDAC. A group of people from
(Building) 919 were moved out and we had to fix up 10,000
square feet. We said it was stupid and a lot of money, a
lot of manpower but the bottom line was we were free
military to accomplish the job and we would provide that
service. In October of 1990 that area did not just
suddenly need work. It had needed it for a long time.
When the merger was happening the people at (Building) 919
let the project go until the merger then instead of
contracting for the job they had us do it and our jobs had
to stop because it took priority. We should never have
been tasked for it.
On the other hand, NIF departments, being primarily
manned by civilian personnel from the old NARDAC and located
in Building 919, resented the mission funded departments'
flexibility in adjusting work schedules. One example of this
that was cited was attendance at the command picnic. Military
personnel simply ensured that duties were covered by personnel
on the watchbill and all others that could be spared were
excused to attend. Civilian personnel were required to take
annual leave in order to attend the picnic since it was held
during a normal workday for some.
The difference in funding methods created the
impression in one Department Head's mind that civilian
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personnel in the departments funded under OM&N or under mixed
funding were being treated unfairly:
Look at the POD (Plan of the Day). It says
congratulations every two or three weeks to people on the
(Building) 919 side of the house. I have put in changes
to two PDs (Civilian Position Descriptions) in the past
year. Those PDs have not moved because we're OM&N funded
and we're being paid different. Their counterparts
(civilian workers) at (Building) 919 are doing the same
work but because we're OM&N, there's no change (upgrade)
in the PDs. I know of cases in that side of the street
where people were promoted in the past year. People over
here see that.
The division in funding was also perceived as guiding how
decisions were made:
They (CO, TD and other Department Heads) are concerned
with their building, their UPS (uninterrupted power
supply), their generators 'cause they loose big money (if
the equipment breaks). If ours breaks there isn't the
push to fix like there is when one of their toys breaks.
Consequently, there are a lot of crisis projects from
(Building) 919. We have to look at fact that if their
system is lost they'll loose money whereas here it's just
some ship or aircraft without a system. For those of us
who've been there that is a big deal. You can't get in
your car on a ship or aircraft and drive away. They can't
get away but it's not looked at a priority 'cause of the
money. It's a philosophy of business.
This division in funding methods did little to cement the
merger and, instead, seemed to heighten the effect of not
having a single mission for entire the command.
C. THE TQL ORGANIZATION
The CO of the newly formed NCTS CONUS had been previously
assigned to a command that had begun instituting Total Quality
Leadership (TQL). Because of his experience with TQL and his
belief that eventually it would become a mandatory program
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throughout the Navy, the CO decided to begin implementation of
TQL at NCTS CONUS. A brief, chronological listing of events
in the implementation process can be found in Appendix C.
1. The QPIC
The Quality/Productivity Improvement Council (QPIC)
was designed to act as an executive steering committee for the
command providing for the strategic planning for the
implementation of TQL within the command. Its membership
included the CO, XO, TD, Department Heads, Command Master
Chief and the TQL Coordinator. It was supposed to meet
approximately once per month and, although there were no
provisions to rotate the chair, it was in effect rotated
amongst department heads in the early stages due to the
occasional absence of the CO and the XO or the TD.
2. Departmental QMBs
Departmental QMBs were made up of the individual
department and division supervisors and managers and chaired
by the Department Head. QMBs reviewed Productivity
Improvement Forms (PIF) containing suggested improvements on
processes within their department. If it was felt that a PIF
contained a viable suggestion but required further study, the
QMB was authorized to convene a Process Action Team (PAT). It
was determined that the QPIC would serve a dual function as a




A PAT was to be comprised of a leader, personnel
involved in the process being studied and, when considered
necessary by the QMB, a TQL facilitator. All participants of
a PAT were chosen by the QMB based on their expertise and
functional responsibilities. The PAT was to examine all
details of the process in relation to the suggestion and
report findings back to the QMB. Once all study on a
particular PIF had been completed, the PAT was to be
dissolved. The QMB was to make the decision as whether to
implement the suggestion as suggested, modify and implement,
or decline the suggestion. If the departmental QMB felt that
a suggestion crossed departmental lines, they were to refer
the PIF to the command QPIC/QMB. All PIFs that were declined
were automatically reviewed by the QPIC/QMB. Others that were
considered viable by departmental QMBs were implemented and
action that was taken on the suggestion in the PIF was to be
presented to the QPIC/QMB for information.
4. EIGs
A PIF could be submitted by either a single
individual, named or anonymous, or by an Employee Improvement
Group (EIG). The EIG was a group of at least ten people from
within a work center or at least ten people who performed the
same type of function across the organization. While
membership in an EIG was considered permanent, it could be
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adjusted as the situation or brainstorming effort required.
Their sole function was to discover processes for improvements
or suggested improvements through brainstorming sessions.
Although room was provided for presenting solutions, a PIF did
not require that a solution be submitted, only that a problem
area be highlighted.
5. Facilitators and Trainers
TQL Facilitators were personnel assigned by the TQL
coordinator and were specifically trained to provide aid to
PATs and QMBs as TQL consultants, assisting in team building,
use of pertinent analytical tools, and in assisting in keeping
meetings focused. Trainers were trained both as Facilitators
and Trainers and were to develop a curriculum for a two hour
all hands Awareness Training. They were then to provide that
training to all personnel in the command.
Trainer/Facilitators were also to provide statistical training
and assistance to PATs.
D. CONFLICTS WITHIN THE COMMAND
The implementation of TQL provided a forum for one
particular issue to come to the surface. The organizational
structure depicted in Figure 4.1 reflects a split at the XO/TD
level on down with unity in the command occurring at the CO's
level. Both the XO and the TD headed up separate
organizations reporting to and being guided by the CO.
Because the TD and the XO both headed separate organizations,
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they each ran their subordinate organization according to
their own management style and in line with their own
priorities. The TD tended toward an authoritarian style of
management and the XO used a more cooperative style of
management. The XO and TD seemed to tolerate differing
degrees of political maneuvering within their respective
organizations resulting in a tendency for members of each
organization to characterize the other along political or
philosophical lines:
Some people on the merger committee said you have to
watch what you say in (Building) 919 'cause of spies. All
information is fed to the TD. He's very powerful. He
sets the tone and climate for how they run over there.
Right now it's spy versus spy. People are really watching
what they say or if you want the TD to know then tell
certain people and they run and tell. We had to be real
careful at merger meetings.
This comment was reflective a lack of trust between the XO and
the TD.
1. Divided Loyalties
The division of the command between the XO and the TD
was reflected in the command's TQL organization as shown in
Figure 4.2 and effected the implementation of TQL in many
ways. The division between XO and TD was perceived as
effecting the way in which PIFs were handled:
One PIF was submitted in September. It was so
fricking simple and it is still sitting on TD's desk...
Those under the XO have a tendency to take action more
readily than those under the TD cause they're waiting for
the TD to say O.K. and he won't say O.K. cause he's not
supportive of the change.
40
The command is split. N3, N4, N1 have a QMB that
reports to the XO. N9 and N2 report directly to TD. We
still have two separate organizations at the QMB levels
with separate meetings. I think that fosters separateness
in the organization. There are philosophical differences
in how PIFs are handled. N2 and N9 are very technical
and, probably because of NIF, spend the minimum time on
problems. The other side of the house spends more time on
them. Whatever it takes. Coordination between the XO and
TD causes a time loss plus that flies in the face of TQL.
Everyone's role is clearly defined but the split at the XO
and TD level is not very good. It makes it more of a
political process at that point.
As QPIC members began to experience the effects of the split
in the organization, individuals' views tended to reflect
loyalty to their respective chain of command. Some were loyal
to the TD:
I am totally frustrated with the civilian/military
split. We have a TD who cares about the organization and
has always run it. The CO has said he runs it and we have
an XO from out in left field who jumps in and mucks it all
up. That's the way I see it. If top management is not
willing to give up empowerment to each other how can they
expect employees to do the same?
while others were loyal to the XO:
... I don't believe that the TD supports it (TQL) with
other than lip service and his attitude seems to get
reflected in his chain (of command). The CO supports it
therefore it's hard for people (under the TD) to get on
board.
Is TQL alive and well in the command? In (the XO's)
departments-yes. In the TD's department's-no. Management
style is different. There are inhibitions due to











2. Perceived Support for TQL
When all hands TQL training commenced, the CO or the
XO made a point of being present at the opening of each
training session, providing words of support and
encouragement. The TD opened no training sessions and his
absence was conspicuous:
I've seen no outward sign that (the TD) supports this
package and therefore neither do some of the civilians.
The Captain supports it 100% but (the TD) would not. It
was impressive to have the CO and/or the XO at every
class. ...if he (the TD) wants it done it will happen.
If we could somehow have gotten him onboard it would have
made the whole effort easier and more credible.
In addition to not opening any training sessions, the TD was
frequently absent from QPIC meetings. When he did attend, he
did not assume the chair of meetings in the CO or XO's absence
but instead countered suggestions for action with reasons why
the suggestions could not be implemented:
The TD dictates how things will be done at QPICs. He
has a list this long (arms outstretched) as to why things
can't be done because of NIF (Navy Industrial Funding).
This lack of action on the TD's part was seen as a lack of
support and was interpreted by one QPIC member as evidence of
the TD's skepticsim about the permanence of TQL:
There's still some lip service paid by some managers.
The TD--it's just another program. All he has to do is
smile, nod his head and it will go away. Do the minimum
required. No big deal. No change of philosophy.
Skepticism was also perceived by management as the
attitude of personnel at lower levels toward TQL. Many
managers believed these personnel saw TQL as just another
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program and that, given enough time, it would go the way of
Management by Objective or Quality Circles:
There's a boatload of skepticism about the program...
People figured this is what's happening now and we'll be
back to business soon.
(The hardest thing was to) overcome the perception of
it's (TQL) just another mandatory program and that it
would become a living program.
MBO and quality circles and then there were COs with
their own little plans like we had one that had green
light sessions, brainstorming on things that were wrong.
When this thing (TQL) came along people said, 'I've seen
it before.' TQL and Quality circles are not much
different except TQL has more management support.
Productivity gain sharing was another one.
(Most challenging thing so far has been) convincing
employees that this is an opportunity to grasp on to.
Opportunity to make a change in spite of the CO's
motivation. Maybe when this CO leaves it can continue.
I'm not hopeless but there's not much fire under the work
force. They want proof before they participate.
In reality, the Chief Petty Officers' Community had
recognized that TQL could work because they recognized many of
the elements of TQL as being essential characteristics of
sound leadership and management. Caught between the Officers
Wardroom, Civilian Managers and the workers, they sought to
bring the command together under TQL by proving the viability
of the program. They mounted an independent effort to "TQL" a
project early in the implementation process. Although their
recommendations and proposed solution were submitted to the
chain of command, no action was ever taken and the current
location and status of their group effort was unknown,
however, there were suspicions as to where it was:
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The Chiefs TQL'd (a problem).. .to prove that TQL could
work. Don't know if the proposal was ever put to CO or
QPIC. I think it got as far as the TD and he squashed it
cause...of his cronies. There's a lot of perceived
favoritism. People are in positions cause of what they've
done for the TD.
The majority of the QPIC members also recognized the
need for some successes with the program in order to dispel
any lack of confidence in TQL and management:
...I think we need a major success story to get
everyone involved. Something popular with employees or
something that they can see as a benefit to them.
QPIC members did realized that in order to get the program to
work it required their support and, since this was a required
program, their support was required. They recognized their
role in the implementation process as being "promoters of the
program", "cheerleaders", and "living proof that TQL would
work" and, in spite of the schism in the senior management
level, resolved to provide the required support for the
program at least outwardly.
With the organizational split being as apparent as it
was to QPIC members, it would probably be naive to believe
that the effects of the split were perceived only at that
level. Lower level supervisors recogniztd that the
organization was not functioning as one:
The merger was a hostile takeover and they're still
trying to work out the quirks. I sometimes think that
they forget us over here.
It was also clearly recognized that there were differences in
the acceptance of TQL at senior management levels:
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The CO left no doubt that he supported what we could
do and where we could go. Support it or don't work for me
is the way our CO went. Some of the senior civilian
supervisors didn't like it and told people they would
fight it. But not on this side of the street. (It was)
the Captain's right hand man-the TD.
E. EMERGENT ISSUES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TQL
1. Work Time Devoted to TQL
With the military personnel, who were primarily OM&N
funded, feeling that they were just free labor for the
civilian side of the house and the civilian personnel, who
were primarily NIF funded, having to deal with accounting for
their time under NIF, the amount of time spent on TQL
activities became the a hot topic for the QPIC. The QPIC had
a difficult time coming to a consensus on this issue:
We (QPIC) had a lot of knock down drag out arguing
about time and cost and 'How can you say we're going to do
it?'.
Sometimes (the QPIC) needed to be jerked back on line
due to too much discussion or controversy. The jerking
was done by the CO, XO or (TD) as part of the group
meeting.
QPIC had a lot of problems agreeing. Deadlock.
Problems encountered were about the sides taken between
the military and civilians.
Since NIF required that all time not devoted to a
specific customer job be written off as revenue lost or
overhead, TQL was seen as an enormous expense by departments
that were NIF funded. OM&N funded departments felt that they
were just too undermanned to be able to afford the lost hours.
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No one was happy about the additional time that TQL activities
would require:
It...see my pile of TQL folders, it's work. Any new
program is. It's not any different.
(It's) a lot of extra work for my people to go
through. A lot. ...(TQL is) manpower intensive and will
take time from normal work. We had to decide whether we
would do normal work or TQL. It was decided we would do
TQL. I think an hour a week is something we don't have
time for, to sit down and do process improvement. We are
undermanned.
One of the problems with TQL is that it's expensive.
Any time not spent producing product is lost revenue.
Trainers had to be the best and that hurt taking the most
productive people.... The work far exceeds the resources
and then along comes someone with the dumb idea of TQL and
now (upper levels of management) have to deal with that,
too.
The TQL organization and responsibilities were
reviewed and the QPIC decided that Process Action Team (PAT)
members' work should be limited to one hour per week and All
Hands Awareness Training would be stretched out over several
months. These actions seemed to make TQL more palatable for
key members of the QPIC and allowed the group to progress
forward:
Overcoming the concept and impact on NIF environment
(was most challenging). It was overcome by laying out
controlling caveats. A person on a PAT can only work one
hour a week on a PAT. That has allowed me to be able to
accept it without total loss of control of my resources.
Stretching the training over several months was done
so that time accounted for under NIF for TQL training did not
have adverse effects on the bottom line (profitability) in any
one work center. It also made scheduling in the mission
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funded departments easier to bear given that those departments
were considered undermanned by their managers. While this
approach may have had its benefits, there was one definite
drawback:
Training was done so long ago people don't remember
it.
We did management training too early. Supervisors
were many months later and then months later there was the
two hour awareness training. Close to a year had elapsed
between management training and awareness training. We
(department heads) need refresher training and we're on
the fore front. Our people may know more (than Department
Heads) cause of what you forget .... It's like having the
pep rally for the Rose Bowl in July and the game in
January. Get everyone pumped up and then start (the game)
six months later.
2. Training Issues
Prior to the merger, NARDAC management and some NCS
management personnel had attended "The Executive Course in
Quality Improvement" presented by the Quality Alert Institute,
Inc. during May 29-30, 1990. This seminar was designed to
introduce management to Total Quality concepts, the basic
tools and techniques of Total Quality and their potential for
application. No effective action had been taken as a result
of this training or exposure to Total Quality. It was
determined that the Quality Alert Institute, Inc. should
return and provide to the CO, XO, TD, Department Heads and
selected military and civilian personnel the same training
previously provided. While this training was being presented
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to some for the second time, there were attendees present who
were being exposed to TQL concepts for the first time.
a. Gaining Commitment to the Expenditure of Funds
for Trainina
By the time QPIC members had completed training
with Quality Alert Institute, Inc., they had been fairly well
exposed to many of the concepts of TQL. Their expectations
for the program, however, were not high because they felt that
the CO was committed to the implementation of TQL only because
he was expected to be. Even though they understood that the
CO had prior successful experience with TQL that caused him to
want to implement it in this command, most felt that the
reason the program was being instituted was because it was
being mandated by seniors further up in the chain of command:
TQL was mandated by the CNO I understand.
Headquarters said, 'You're gonna implement this.' Here we
are trying to sell this to employees who've been through
some of these programs. There used to be a Human
Resources bunch, too, with computerized surveys. That's
what we're up against.
(It was implemented because) they knew it would be
mandated.
I think TQL was implemented because of direction from
the Navy....
(It was implemented) because the CO was told to. I
take that back. Cause the CNO was pushing it and the CO
wants to get ahead.
Guidance from on high. 'You will implement. You will
write an instruction. You will provide training' That
portion was very much a dictating influence.
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Although the CO had declared his personal
commitment to the implementation of TQL, not all department
heads felt that the cost of training would provide enough of
a return to warrant the required expenditure:
The CO made painful decisions as far as money is
concerned. It was $50,000 for training for the QPIC and
the trainers. There was a lot of resistance from those on
the QPIC. We all knew our departments and our problems
but the Captain saw real benefits.
All of the civilian contractors for TQL training
were very expensive and expenditure of the funds was seen as
a waste by some, compared to other projects within the command
that would be either unfunded or receive less funds because of
the expenditure of funds for TQL training. The CO was
committed to obtaining the training and Department Heads just
had to accept that:
I'd been in on discussion and plans. We'd decided and
then just went from there. Command decision. It wasn't
optional.
CO had a way to do it and the CO convinced us (XO and
TD).
Money. It's just a cost. We decided to commit X
amount of dollars and do it right.
The CO put on blinders and said, 'We're gonna do it.'
And when he said that, everything goes by the wayside.
b. Attempts to Reduce the Cost of TraininQ
After training the QPIC, formal TQL training still
required within the command included follow-on training for
the QPIC, Facilitators, Trainers, and all hands Awareness
Training. The QPIC met several times to discuss the
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selection of vendors for training. Since content and quality
of training tends to vary from contractor to contractor, the
QPIC agreed that, to ensure continuity, the command would
continue using Quality Alert Institute for the follow on
training. As the issue of the cost of training came up,
though, this decision was to be revisited a number of times
before it was finalized.
In following QPIC meetings, other alternatives
were explored. CCPO was queried regarding vendor training
packages and a proposal by a new company had come to the
QPIC's attention. Still, the training was expensive. Other
commands in the area were offered seats in training sessions
in order to offset costs but when no other commands expressed
an interest, it became apparent that the cost would be born by
NCTS CONUS alone. The QPIC began exploring other ways to
reduce the cost of training.
Initially, 13 people had been nominated for
Trainer and 19 people had been nominated for Facilitator. Ten
Facilitators and ten Trainers, a mixture of military and
civilian personnel from both mission and NIF funded
departments, were anticipated for selection. However, the
issue of the cost of training and, perhaps, NIF may have
forced a reduction to more realistic numbers in terms of cost:
five Facilitators, four Trainers, with the TQL Coordinator,
who was a mid-grade civilian employee, being trained as an
additional Trainer. Additionally, Trainers would be trained
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as Facilitators so that they could serve a dual role as both
Trainer and Facilitator. This action further validated the
reduced numbers. Seats in the classes would be opened to the
NCTS's newly acquired remote site in another city. Seats were
also offered to and accepted by another NCTC activity in an
adjoining geographic area which paid for the billets that it
used. While this offset some of the cost of training, the
bulk of the cost was still covered by NCTS CONUS. Later, TQL
training would be quantified at $4500 per hour revenue lost
and this quantification probably reinforced the general
perception amongst QPIC members that TQL was an expensive
program.
c. Selecting Trainers and Facilitators
Since the TQL Coordinator had already been
selected to attend the training, the original field of 32
people nominated for Facilitator and/or Trainer had to be
reduced to nine. The QPIC chose to do this via murder board
procedures. When a murder board is held, nominators must
present their nominees and their qualifications along with the
reasons why they believe the nominee would be best in the
position. Other members of the board are permitted to insert
their opinions and experiences with the nominees and to
question the nominator about their candidate. Murder boards
are often characterized by spirited discussion and, by some
accounts, this murder board was no exception:
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Being on the QPIC, I've seen folks trying to
manipulate what's going on. (They were) overly selective
as to who could be a Facilitator, how things would be
done, why some were qualified or not to be a Trainer.
Eventually, the QPIC did agree on five Facilitators and four
Trainers in addition to the TQL Coordinator.
From the first meeting of the QPIC on 06 February,
to the final decisions regarding who would provide the
training and who would attend the training, and when the
training would be held, it had required a month and a half and
five QPIC meetings to reach a consensus on these issues
amongst members on the QPIC. Even then, the consensus was not
a true one because decisions were reported to have been made
only after the CO stepped in, took charge and made some of
those decisions for the group in order to reduce conflict.
3. The First Process
a. Choosing the First Process
In order to determine what process should be
studied first, members of the QPIC submitted ideas for
discussion and during the meeting of 14 May, all ideas were
reviewed. The group determined that the first process should
be one felt by employees throughout the command. The subject
of Alternative Work Schedules (AWS) was proposed as a
sensitive issue with many people, both civilian and military,
in part because of the mission/NIF accounting methods. The
effect of changes to command policy would be widespread and
felt deeply. Based on this fact, the QPIC tentatively chose
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AWS as the first process for study. Since the issues involved
in AWS would definitely cross department boundaries, the QPIC
would serve as the QMB for the study. It was confirmed during
the following QPIC meeting that AWS would be the first process
studied. Not everyone was happy about the selection:
Picking the AWS was the CO's decision. I did not like
it because it was way too broad. The first should have
been very simple to be done within a month. There were so
many others. Plus it's not going to turn out the way
people want. Majority of people that talk to me about it
want to know why it's taking so long. Some people (feel
that), and I feel this way, is that it is something that
the CO can just make a decision on. Feelings are too
diversified. There's no way to make everyone happy.
b. Forming the First PAT
Nominees for the AWS PAT were presented by
Department Heads at a meeting of the QPIC. Little debate of
nominees' qualifications was noted and a list of individuals
was published as an approved list of PAT members in the 01
July, newsletter. It was reported that some PAT members were
not aware of their nominations or selections to the PAT until
the newsletter was published. One member of the QMB was
assigned the responsibility for developing a charter for the
PAT and the TQL Coordinator was assigned to develop an
information package on AWSs for their use.
Although the PAT was given a charter, there was no
time limit on the team's existence and the team was told to
take as many weeks as was needed to complete the gathering of
data. While that was probably meant to keep the participants
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from feeling like they had some impossible deadline to meet,
it had a somewhat different effect:
Management expects this particular PAT to be a long
drawn out process. They told us to take as long as we
need and that's what's happening. I don't want to sit on
the AWS PAT for the remainder of my time here.
I see people concerned on slowness of it. The big one
in the mill the longest is something that effects everyone
(AWS PAT). People are concerned cause they're interested
and they're not getting anything except, 'We're working on
it.'
I think we're studying AWS to death. We discussed
doing simple things but decided to do something meaningful
and we either started too late or picked something too
hard. Now it looks like another management slow roll.
We'll meet for two years or until it's (TQL) canceled.
Skeptical attitudes are reinforced.
AWS is being beat to death. They're going to beat it
into submission til it waves a white flag.
There was no indication that the PAT's charter had
been shared with anyone outside of the QPIC/QMB or the PAT
itself. According to the command's TQL Instruction, the QPIC,
acting in the capacity of the QMB for this issue since it
crossed departmental lines, assigned members to the PAT and
chartered the PAT. No formal provision for informing Division
Officers or supervisors of the assignment or charter were
made.
c. Internal Workinas of the PAT
During the time that the AWS PAT was being formed
and chartered, command personnel were beginning to attend
facilitator and trainer training. When that training was
completed, a trainer/facilitator was assigned to the AWS PAT
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but, from some accounts, never used as fully as they could
have been. Group members tended to feel that more training on
how to apply the tools, especially statistical, was necessary:
For people with no analytical background, some kind of
training is needed. Our charter does not give 'how to'
(information).
We haven't done too much statistical training. It's
been said that if a problem comes up that needs
statistical study then we'll get training for statistics.
Should have been taught as much as steps in the process.
When we first got the PAT together we had to come up
with a way of gathering data. Trying to come up with a
way to gather it was most challenging. We came up with a
questionnaire to ask people in the command if they wanted
an AWS ....
Although the role of the trainer/facilitator is to provide
that kind of training, it was not provided:
It's important when a PAT first is formed to train
them on these areas (data gathering and statistics) before
even attempting to study a process. Trainers could
possibly do this. They received training in June but I
don't know, it's been so long since they were trained and
I don't know if their supervisors would let them go.
In the meantime, as other command members
completed Awareness Training and began to understand the
purpose of the AWS PAT, the team began tc experience peer
pressure for some action. This may have contributed to a
growing feeling of frustration for some PAT members. They
began to feel that people just didn't understand the scope of
the project that they had undertaken and that their peers had
unrealistic expectations of TQL:
My sense is that there is a perception on part of the
people that we're not moving fast enough. They don't
understand all that's involved in looking at AWS. They
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forget that these PATs are not working on this stuff full
time.
We need leaders who can lead and not groups trying to
make decisions. For instance, the AWS PAT is taking so
long we'll never change. We'll never come to a decision.
The AWS PAT only met once every three to four weeks due to the
one hour a week limit set by the QPIC on the hours they could
spend on the project. During weeks that no meetings were
scheduled, PAT members were to spend that one hour a veek
collecting data. The QPIC meeting of 23 August had rescinded
the one hour limitation on the AWS PAT but some people still
believed it to be in effect and no additional meeting times
were scheduled.
Frustration for some of the members of the AWS PAT
centered on the amount of participation of other PAT members
and the limited amount of time they had together:
I would like to have been on a PAT that seers more
organized. This one is the first but we would need more
meetings. We only meet once a month. Once a week might
have been sufficient. We need more time together to
discuss and talk about problems. By the time we get to
the next meeting we forget what happened at the last one.
I feel like I've been wasting my time.
On some occasions, some members would report to meetings with
no data or information collected and this led to speculation
by other members that they had not been able to get the
allotted one hour a week to work on the project and this was
attributed to supervisors' lack of support or PAT members'
lack of interest:
...management won't give up time for the work force to
be active in it and the PAT for AWS. That's not going to
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be on their performance appraisal or evaluation so they
work on those things that go on their performance
appraisal.
... civilian personnel in their divisions and
departments, they had a hard time getting time to work on
their projects .... That's the excuse they used and I have
no way of proving them wrong.
The team did develop a survey to be administered throughout
the command to gather opinions on acceptable AWS alternatives
and began to gather data. Data gathering, however, was still
not complete as of December 1991.
4. PIF Processing
A Productivity Improvement Form (PIF) is used to
document suggestions developed by either an employee or
Employee Improvement Group (EIG) and submitted to the TQL
Coordinator for assignment of a number and entry into the
tracking system. It would then be processed as depicted in
Figure 4.3. This process was published in the command's TQL
newsletter for all hands.
The PIF tracking system allows for the constant
tracking of status and location of a PIF. The system was put
on E-mail so that anyone with access to E-mail could call up
the status board and check current status. Status was updated
weekly. The E-mail system had not been extended to all
departments but plans were to put the entire command on the
system. A listing of PIFs with their current status was
posted on all command TQL Bulletin Boards. Some PIFs were
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Figure 4.3 PIF Processing Flow
languishing in any particular "In" box, PIFs were routed in
bright yellow folders and their status reviewed at each QPIC
meeting.
a. Jumping the Chain of Copand
The PIF submission and processing procedures
turned out to be a source of much misunderstanding and some
discontent. A number of management personnel felt that this
processing route allowed members of the command to jump the
chain of command with any issue. In the PIF processing flow
there were no formal provisions for informing Division
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Officers and supervisors of PIFs. Formally, they had been
left out of the loop. Many of the initial PIFs submitted were
perceived as complaints or gripes about things, some of which
had been resurrected from times past, vice constructive
suggestions or concerns for process or productivity
improvement:
It's given people, some people that were anti-
management with certain constant problem areas, it's
another channel for those to be addressed. Case in point,
coat and ties (the dress code for civilian personnel was
a recurring and sensitive issue). It's a positive way to
channel from confrontative to cooperative on issues.
Some people put in suggestions to test the system,
push them through, make it fly....
A hefty portion (of the suggestions are) not
appropriate for PIFs. They're Benny Suggs (Beneficial
Suggestions) or axes to grind. Department Heads have
generally diverted those to the right channels.
All of this put some managers on the defensive and
may have added to the feeling that the use of PIFs permitted
people to jump the chain of command:
We treat people like people and you don't use people
at all. TQL is for departments where managers use people.
As long as I'm here...people will feel free to submit
ideas without using PIF forms and bypassing the chain of
command.
This perception was somewhat shared by personnel at lower
levels but in a slightly different light. It was perceived by
some that TQL was a means that had not existed before that
forced management to look at issues.
At my level, getting people at lower echelons to
participate (has been most challenging). They don't
believe it. It's too good to be true. They've been beat
over the head by the system too long. They want to wait
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and see if it's a real deal.. .but there's a better feeling
amongst people that ideas are being paid attention to,
that there's an official avenue there now.
(The most stimulating thing about TQL is) the fact
that you can have suggestions about changes and know that
they won't get stopped in the chain of command.
Getting the military side involved has been easiest.
Give a sailor a forum and he'll take pot shots. Over at
(Building) 506 there are people who feel they can say what
they want. May not be well received but they'll say it.
I believe it's a real good program. I think upper
management is, if you want to call it, stubborn about
taking lower management's ideas and ignoring them. It's
improving the way upper management looks at our ideas.
Others really did see the PIF submission and processing flow
as a means for jumping the chain of command:
This TQL is the only way for workers to bypass
supervisors that won't listen or that they can't get along
with.
TQL allows you to bring things up, jump the chain of
command, without getting in trouble-that's not a good
word-without looking like jumping over the boss.
Oddly enough, personnel at the management level, both military
and civilian, seemed to think that TQL was a program that had
always been done on the military side of the house and that it
was the civilian side of the house that was in the most need
of it in order to give civilian personnel a long denied
opportunity to put forth suggestions and get credit for them
or to not be labeled as a troublemaker:
People made suggestions and others took claim to it
and got credit. A lot of those are really very devious
over there (Civilian personnel in Building 919). TQL will
really help that side of the house.
(It's) giving people an opportunity to state ideas
even when they're not on processes. Some (ideas) are just
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bitches. If they had put them in the CO's Suggestion Box
they would have been labeled a troublemaker. This seems
to avoid that if we act on them (ideas) in a positive way.
b. Crossing Department Lines
From September through mid-December, 43 PIFs had
been submitted and those that fell within Department
boundaries were being acted on by Departmental QMBs. None of
the successful actions were publicized to the entire command
except through the PIF tracking system:
We're not doing a very good job of advertising changes
through the command. I skim the TQL newsletter, the POD
but unless it's going to attack me, I don't stay after it.
They should publicize what they're talking about, the
little things that they took care of quick.
Eventually, resolving PIFs that crossed
departmental lines took on an element of importance for the
QPIC. In the investigation of a particular PIF, a simple and
direct solution was found that could be instituted at no cost
and would eliminate a source of annoyance for some people. To
the members involved, neither the issue or the solution
appeared to involve other departments, however, when the
changes were instituted and the QPIC apprised of events, the
Department Head who had taken the initiative also took some
heat from fellow QPIC members for not clearing things through
them:
(The Department Head) got hassled at the QPIC because
he hadn't consulted with other Department Directors, his
peers. That carries over when one sees the hassles. Then
others won't do anything. Co had to shut it down.
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One problem we found at the QPIC: where do you
determine if PIF crosses department boundary? Department
Heads have to determine. Some are very clear, some run
full shades of grey. There's no good line and some
Department Heads have implemented things that had impact
outside of their departments. CO was a bit annoyed with
people who complained and still left it (decision to
implement) to Department Heads. Screw it, do it, deal
with consequences later.
Despite the CO's strong support for the Department Head who
had taken action, this type of reaction may have led to some
later inaction on PIFs, non-documentation or non-reporting of
improvements, and failure to report formation of PATs for
Facilitator assignment. It was beginning to appear that the
formal processing procedure for PIFs was being skirted when
possible.
c. A TOL Bureaucracy
TQL, with its formal structure and rules for
processing PIFs, was perceived as becoming a bureaucracy of
its own:
TQL here is becoming a program. Bad way because it's
becoming a check in the block. Management of it is
becoming a political, elaborate structure that supports
it. It's becoming bureaucratized, making it an office
with office furniture and people.
Personnel were beginning to find ways around the
blossoming bureaucracy. Although PIFs were supposed to go
directly from originator to the TQL coordinator, Department
Heads would sometimes keep them within their departments
taking action as they saw fit and when they saw fit but never
entering them into the system. There were efforts in several
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departments' QMBs to form PATs to investigate processes within
departmental lines but these were not reported to the TQL
Coordinator for Facilitator assignment. At one QPIC meeting,
one member indicated that a PAT had been formed to investigate
check-in/check-out procedures, however, no facilitator was
assigned to it and it eventually ceased meeting. Despite the
fact that this issue crossed departmental lines, the QPIC
failed to pick up the PAT for follow up.
The belief that no good ideas could be acted on
without being documented on a PIF was growing. This belief
made management feel that earlier expectations about TQL being
a lot of work were justified but also raised the specter of
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980. Not only were management
personnel beginning to view TQL as just extra work, they were
also beginning to see it as a paperwork drill:
Some managers and supervisors may feel that they have
to wait to make changes until it has run through the TQL
process .... That ideas must be documented on PIF and then
the manager becomes a paperwork processor and can't get
simple decisions made.
There are things that come up where people submit a
PIF. It's a long and drawn out process. Before, I would
have just said, 'Let's go with it. Good idea.' but now to
get people involved, I take more time. Get them involved
in submitting a PIF.
...Another thing, this is a paperwork nightmare.
Everything has to be documented to prove your point. This
is the folder I've got. I could have made it thicker if
I had wanted to. That's almost a tree right there and
with cost reduction and the environment thing this is a
waste and it is against the paper work reduction program.
Paperwcrk is snowballing.
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NCTC had issued a TQL instruction requiring
quarterly reports on the status of the implementation of TQL
within each activity. Now, in addition to required PIF
documentation, a quarterly report was required. As a natural
result of having to report status of the implementation of
TQL, it became very important for the program to be able to
report accomplishments:
I hope it doesn't turn into a contest--Who has the
most PIFs. It is becoming that at this command. The
reports to Telcom (NCTC) worsens the political nature of
it. It can't help but become 'Gee, we're not doing
enough.'
The number of PIFs submitted by department was becoming
important and those departments with few or no PIFs were made
aware of the fact that the number of PIFs submitted was known
and tracked by the CO:
We say we can't push it down peoples' throats yet we
get E-mail from the CO requesting status of PIFs and if I
don't have something, it's negative.
The number of PIFs was becoming important enough that one
department head simply ordered that PIFs be written and
submitted:
Up until last week we were the only department with no
PIFs. I've been after my Division Officers to get at
least one in to make it look like we're playing the game.
We've put in one in my division cause we were directed
to put in a PIF so we took a pot shot at another division.
5. Current Status
The QPIC could rarely come to a consensus on its own
without an inordinate amount of discussion and sometimes
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conflict. One method that was used to reduce conflict during
meetings was to assign one member to collect input from all
other members on a specific topic. Decisions were then made
based on the compiled data presented at following meetings.
In an attempt to keep things moving, the CO had eventually
begun actively chairing and moderating all of the QPIC
meetings. In spite of this, he felt that the QPIC was at a
point where it could be considered self-sustaining and planned
to begin withdrawing his personal forceful involvement.
The command completed the DOD self assessment survey
in December 1991 in an effort to determine the next step in
the implementation process but the CO was concerned that
Department Heads might have feared the assessment. He felt
they were concerned that the assessment would show that
Department Heads hadn't been doing TQL enough.
Most in management were confused as to how TQL
differed from what they had been doing all along. There was
confusion amongst key members of the TQL organization as to
what was the difference between TQL and the old Beneficial
Suggestions or Military Cash Awards Program. One department
head felt that participation in TQL indicated that management
was not performing up to standard:
I don't expect people to put in PIFs. If you get
eight or ten PIF in each division then something is wrong.
It shouldn't take MBO or TQL to solve problems. It
shouldn't be one or two people saying, 'No, I don't want
it done that way.'
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Lower level supervisors still felt, however, that TQL could
work to solve some of their problems:
I believe in it. I believe it's gonna work. Not like
religion, it's been proven. It works. Learn it, do it,
and it will work. The proof is there.
I believe it could work if everybody gave it an honest
effort. To look at PIFs that come in front of them in a
realistic way saying it could work instead of just no.
The feeling had a sense of urgency to it, though, because now
they were beginning to feel that they had to get things done
using TQL while they still could, while it was still around
and had support:
My biggest fear is that further down the road the next
skipper could just rubber stamp things. Some of the
civilians have been afraid that they couldn't get things
done quick enough, while there was still enthusiasm for
the program.
With a change of command planned in June, the concerns for
what would happen when the new CO checked on board were
beginning to mount:
I do have a concern. If the next CO is going to be as
strong a supporter as (our CO). (I'm concerned) that he
will make tradeoffs: 'TQL or something else? We'll do
TQL later.' Hopefully as Navy and DOD get more experience
and people get more exposed, this will evaporate over
time.
Will the next CO be as strong on TQL? Are people
going to be able to use what they learned? Will all my
time be wasted?
There were some that held out hope for the program:
It needs help. We need to convince the work force and
all levels of management that it will work and that they
won't lose control. There are some people who could
really make it work and are gung ho and just need the
leverage to do it.
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On a scale of 1 to 10, we're about a .9 in the change
process. It's not fully accepted but implementation is
started. Some understand, some have already forgotten but
it's onboard and it's happening.
And there were some that were very optimistic about the future
and potential of TQL:
People don't want to admit to using TQL but I see
people who are and they come to me and say, 'We're trying
to do this PAT.... ' We're getting somewhere.
Got another one (PIF) today. Pretty slick. People
are getting more sophisticated. Haven't got one that will
save me a million bucks but you never know.
Many members reported that the Total Quality effort
had made them more conscious of putting a quality effort into
their own work and a large number of personnel saw personal
satisfaction for a job well done to be the main reward for
participating in the program. It did appear that TQL, even
with its problems, was having some positive impact and it
appeared that it was the only thing that the entire command
was working on together.
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V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Understanding and analyzing any change cannot be done in
isolation from the organizational context. The influence of
context is strongly demonstrated in the NCTS CONUS case.
Therefore, before examining the change process initiated with
the implementation of TQL, an analysis of the changes involved
in the merger is presented.
A. THE MERGER
1. Building the New Organization
a. The Organizational Identity
The values and norms of an organization guide the
behavior of the people in the organization in the
accomplishment of their purpose. Values are conveyed through
common jargon, rituals, history, symbols and management or
leadership styles. Norms are conveyed either informally or
formally through policies and procedures [Ref 13). Values
and beliefs are basic to an organization's identity and an
organization's :undamental purpose provides meaning to
people's work. An organization's purpose has its basis in the
organization's values and beliefs [Ref 14]. Changes to the
core values, norms or purpose of an organization bring
uncertainty through loss of the current identity. If a new
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identity does not fill the gap created by the loss of the
current identity, an organization will tend to revert back to
that which was lost in order to maintain that which is
essential to its survival, its identity. Realigning with the
old identity does not solve the problem of adapting to or
dealing with necessary changes, but it does provide the
organization with a false sense of security that enables it to
continue to function. This false sense of security provides
a necessary feeling of stability for the organization as
fundamental changes in the organization's identity are
attempted. Thus, while changes may require that old values,
beliefs, norms or purpose be relinquished, it is necessary
that the organization have profound replacements firmly in
place in order to reduce the anxiety stemming from
uncertainties associated with loss or change. [Ref 15]
b. Hanging On to Individual Organizational
Identities
Prior to the merger, both the NCS and the NARDAC
had its own identity based on its own values, norms, beliefs
and purpose. There were fundamental differences in the two
organizations: different missions, different funding methods,
different work force composition, and different management and
leadership styles. No effort was made to establish a new set
of values, norms, beliefs or purpose that would be common to
both organizations and, consequently, enable the new
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organization to reconcile its fundamental differences and
develop its own unique identity. Since no common set of
values, norms, beliefs or purpose existed to replace those of
the individual organizations, and the individual
organizational identities were not relinquished and, even
though merged in name, the two organizations remained
structurally and functionally separate.
When NCTC directed the merger of the NCS and the
NARDAC, they were reacting to the merger of communications and
computer technologies in the commercial world. Current
technologies make distinguishing communication equipment from
computers impossible. The functional overlap of Navy
communications and computer commands and personnel ratings was
beginning to occur without the benefit of a centralized
command structure to support uniform technological changes and
growth. The merger of the commands was, thus, an attempt to
formally merge function in response to an already merged
technology and an effort to reap the benefits of a
bureaucratic structure through centralized control. At NCTS
CONUS, no attempt was made to establish the new command's
identity based on this merger of functions and technology. As
a result, the two major elements of the command retained their
individual identities in order to continue to provide meaning
to their work and permitting each to continue to function,
albeit with a false sense of security.
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c. Laying the Foundation for a Comon Identity
Organizational identities, obviously, are not
developed overnight but develop over time, tailored to fit the
needs of the organization. Even if the new command had
recognized the need to develop a new identity, it would have
been impossible to establish a new command identity that would
become effective on the date of the merger. Time and skillful
management of the change process is required to enable an
organization to adjust to changes to its core values, beliefs,
norms and purpose gradually developing its new identity.
However, efforts could have been undertaken prior to the
merger to identify, develop and publish some common values,
norms and a purpose as starting point for the new
organization. In doing this, the effects of the merger could
have been mitigated providing for greater stability in the
change and laying the groundwork for fundamental merger of
functions within the new organization.
The need still exists to unite the command on
common ground. Top management needs to build a consensus on
core values, develop common norms and a common purpose.
Establishment of common rituals and symbols will help members
feel and adjust to the new unity. There are differences in
both commands that cannot be changed. Different values, norms
and purposes drove the establishment of different funding
methods, different work force compositions and, as a result,
different management and leadership styles developed to deal
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with these value-based differences. Different missions,
funding methods and work force compositions will continue to
be a fact of life and just developing common value&, norms and
purposes will not reconcile these differences. Top
management's approach to these differences must be reconciled
in its different leadership and management styles based on the
new values, norms and purposes.
2. Analysis at the Individual Level
a. Facing Uncertainty
The more control that an individual has over
changes in the environment, the safer those changes seem.
When an individual has little control over changes in the
environment, those changes are threatening. Change, then, is
seen as a loss of control and a common reaction to loss of
control is defensive territorial behavior. This kind of
behavior is evidence that the individual is attempting to hold
on to the known rather than face the risks of the unknown.
The unknown may require that old habits and routines be
disrupted and that workloads increase. The unknown may mean
that old competencies are no longer acceptable and that new
skills will have to be learned in order for personnel to be
considered competent. And lastly, the unknown may pose a real
threat to the security of an individual's job. The
uncertainties of all of these things will cause the individual
to feel powerless and out of control and cause the individual
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to seek the safety of the known. The individual will attempt
to hold on to the current situation, resisting the change.
[Ref 16]
b. Uncertainty Created by the Merger
The XO and the TD were not in control of whether
or not the merger would happen. That was done to them by
higher authorities. The reaction to this loss of control was
to retain the form and function of each of their respective
organizations (territories) in order to minimize the impact of
the changes brought on by the merger. Both individuals,
however, felt threatened by the events occurring around them
and must have seen the reshuffling at the top management level
as a real threat. Their response was to behave in a
predictably territorial manner, each carefully guarding the
authority and boundaries of his individual organization. By
maintaining their organizations more or less intact, they were
able to continue doing business as usual with workloads
remaining essentially the same. The XO did not have to get
involved in the computer end of the business and the TD did
not have to get involved in the communications end of the
business. Neither had to learn new skill in order to manage
competently in an alien world. The end result of this safety
seeking behavior was a failure to merge the two commands in
such a way that would permit the eventual merger of functions
using the combined technology concept as a foundation.
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c. Reducing Uncertainty
To reduce resistance, management must recognize
the source of the resistance and provide as much information
about the change as possible to the participants. If the
threat is real and personnel will lose their jobs or be moved,
the best course of action is one that provides for swift
action and a clean break to prevent a buildup of anxiety,
frustration, and resistance that could possibly infect the
organization [Ref 16]. One way to keep expertise but
unencumber the change process is to move those who cannot
adjust into staff billets where their expertise is needed but
they do not have to be involved in the change [Ref 12].
One way in which the XO and the TD could have been
provided information on the merger that would have reduced
some of their resistance would have been to put them both on
the merger committee. The two would have been forced to
investigate and resolve issues rather than just independently
make decisions about issues based on data presented to them.
Interaction between the two might have reduced uncertainty
about the intentions of the other and thus reduced territorial
behaviors.
On the other hand, their behavior may have been a
reflection of their individual recognition of the duplication
in the command's organizational structure. The current
command structure is an impediment to the combination of
functions based on combined technology because it inhibits
75
functional group interaction and communication across
functional boundaries. Considering the previous reshuffling
of top management, neither the XO or the TD would feel secure
in their jobs once they have recognized that the duplication
in the command's organizational structure was probably
unnecessary.
In order to correct the situation, either the XO
or the TD billet needs to be eliminated or the TD billet moved
to head up the Plans Department (staff). Eliminating the XO
billet could create anxiety and uncertainty in the military
work force aggravating the feeling that they are not
important. Eliminating the TD billet could cause the command
to alienate key members of the civilian work force and,
possibly, cause the loss of some significant expertise from
the civilian work force due to individual loyalties. Moving
the TD to head the Plans Department might allow the command to
retain the TD's expertise without alienating members of the
civilian work force. The recommended course of action is to
move the TD billet to a staff position and to make the change
as quickly as possible to prevent further discord in the
command and complication of the implementation of TQL.
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B. IMPLEMENTING TQL
1. Mobilize Commitment Through Joint Diagnosis of Current
Situation
a. Commitment and Timing
The only way to develop a common understanding of
why change is required is for top management to jointly assess
the organization's current situation [Ref 12]. It's extremely
important that top management develop a common understanding
of why change is required and be committed to that
understanding because it is top management that must lead the
organization through the change. With change creating
uncertainty, personnel react with fear and anxiety, and
personnel look to leadership to reassure them that the change
is safe. If top management does not appear convinced that the
change is necessary and safe, subordinates will not risk the
uncertainty of change and will resist change. Additionally,
too much uncertainty at one time can result in strong feelings
of loss of control leading to resistance to change. Planned
changes, then, require strategic timing to enable personnel to
mentally and emotionally prepare for changes and commitment to
the change by top management in order to minimize resistance.
[Ref 16]
b. How the Timing of the Implementation oi TOL
Effected Commitment
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TQL came directly on the heels of the merger.
Little time was allowed for the new organization to develop
and adopt its new identity before the implementation of TQL
was begun. Too many changes too close together created too
much uncertainty and the result was resentment and resistance
to the implementation of TQL. Top management, having
difficulties coping with the uncertainties that remained
unresolved from the merger and those created by the
implementation of TQL, resorted to territorial behaviors
resisting the implementation of TQL.
Top management was clear on only one thing about
TQL and that was that its implementation was being directed.
This, like the merger, was a change that would ultimately
effect their core values and, thus, their organizational
identity. It was a change done to them leaving top management
with a sense of loss of control and uncertain about why or how
TQL should be implemented. Being military, the XO's choices
were limited: support the program despite the uncertainties
and his personal reservations or sacrifice his career. The
uncertainties of sacrificing his career certainly outweighed
the uncertainties of implementing a program directed by
seniors in a command that he would eventually leave. He chose
to provide outward support for the implementation of TQL. The
TD, on the other hand, had the same basic choices but, because
the implement and transfer option was not available, he chose
to deal with the uncertainties of the new program by simply
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waiting. If he could wait long enough wih-out doing anything
substantial, TQL might eventually fade away as other
management programs in the past and his organization would be
relatively unchanged continuing to retain its identity and
purpose.
Top management was struggling with the
dysfunctional organizational structure created as a result of
the uncertainties of the merger. They did not have a common
understanding of why the implementation of TQL was necessary
or how it would work. Too much uncertainty resulted in
resistance to the implementation of TQL and uneven commitment
to it at top levels of management. Lower level managers could
not consistently look to their leaders for reassurances that
the implementation of TQL was good and, therefore, had great
difficulty providing support for TQL since it only seemed to
plunge them and the command into greater uncertainty.
c. False Starts
If top management does not understand why changes
are important, Critical Mass will not be achieved and the
organization is likely to march off smartly in the wrong
direction. W. Edwards Deming describes these false starts as
being
...deceptive. They give satisfaction, something to show
for effort, but they lead to frustration, despair,
disappointment, and delay. [Ref 5:p. 135]
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NCTS CONUS has, essentially, gotten off to a false start that
will provide management with something to report to NCTC in
their quarterly reports but is leading to frustration and
resentment. It will adversely effect the functioning of the
TQL organization and delay the acceptance of new behaviors and
competencies in the command organization. Since Critical Mass
has not been achieved, it is crucial to the success of the
change effort to back up and develop a common understanding of
why change using TQL is needed and to develop commitment to
the understanding through joint diagnosis of the command's
current situation.
2. Developing a Shared Vision
a. The Vision
Once Critical Mass is achieved, the development of
a shared vision by the Critical Mass can begin [Ref 12]. The
shared vision is a view of the organization in the future and
gives the current organization something to stretch and aim
for [Ref 8]. Before developing a vision for the organization
it is necessary that the organization have a starting point
and a mission statement can serve as that starting point
[Ref 17].
A mission statement is based on an organization's
values, beliefs and purpose. It provides members of the
organization with an overarching goal [Ref 14]. Guiding
principles further define and support the mission statement
80
and the vision statement and are designed to guide the actions
of members of the organization in achievement of their mission
and pursuit of the vision [Ref 8]. Involved in the
development of the vision must also be the development of an
understanding of how the organization is going to grow and
develop to reach the vision [Ref 12). Change requires a leap
of faith, faith that the vision can be reached. If the upper
levels of management cannot make that leap it is because they
have not been given enough information to assure them that
they can make the leap and that the leap is good [Ref 16].
b. Laying the Groundwork for Building a Vision
Statement
NCTS CONUS is starting at ground zero with no
commonly held values, beliefs or purpose on which to base a
command mission statement. Since a command's mission
statement is based on the organization's values, beliefs and
purpose it is important that NCTS CONUS' Critical Mass develop
a statement of those values on which they want to base the
future of their organization. They need to develop the
groundwork for the command's beliefs about itself and the
world in which it exists by developing a statement of beliefs
and, then, they need to unite the organization with a common
purpose. Based on these developments, they can develop a
mission statement to serve as their starting point for their
vision statement. Drawing upon the mission statement and the
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recognized need for change developed in the previous analysis,
top management can clearly layout where it is the command must
go. How the command will get where it is headed has been
directed to be TQL.
Because the implementation of TQL was directed
vice being developed by the command as their chosen course of
action as a means for reaching their vision, there is a lack
of commitment to TQL. The lack of commitment to TQL is caused
by the uncertainties stemming from a lack of understanding of
TQL and how it is to be implemented. Uncertainty and a sense
of loss of control exists within the upper levels of
management and are driving their actions, i.e, territorial
behaviors. Further education on the purpose of TQL and how it
is supposed to work is needed so that upper management can
develop implementation plans for their own organization
according to their needs. This is necessary in order to
minimize the resistance within upper levels of management and
build commitment to the shared vision.
3. Foster Consensus for the Vision, Skills to Build it,
and Constancy of Purpose
a. Foster Consensus for the Vision
In fostering consensus for the vision, the
parallel structure that will be used as a mechanism for
managing the change process should be developed. Roles and
responsibilities should be defined [Ref 12] and internal
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operating rules for the components developed [Ref 2]. The TQL
organization should be a microcosm of the command organization
formed along process lines. Care should be taken in
developing the parallel structure for two reasons: 1)
Dysfunctionalities in the command structure can be recreated
in the structure of the parallel organization and will
determine the degree of political behavior within the parallel
organization and, thus, the effectiveness of the parallel
structure; 2) The degree to which the parallel structure is
perceived as supplanting the command organization will
determine the support it receives from top management, and
thus, the success of the parallel structure [Ref 18].
(1) The Potential for Duplicating Dysfunction in
a Parallel Structure. An organization seeks safety and
certainty in dealing with changes by resisting change [Ref
16]. In dealing with changes brought about because of the
implementation of a parallel structure, an organization is
likely to attempt to reduce uncertainty by remaining with what
it knows. A dysfunctional organization will perceive that it
is easier to deal with its known dysfunctions than the unknown
[Ref 16]. A dysfunctional organization will, therefore, be
more likely to create a parallel structure with the same
dysfunctionalities as the command organization in an attempt
to reduce uncertainty by remaining with the same
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organizational paradigm even if the original paradigm is
dysfunctional.
Organizations with unclear or ill-defined goals
and competing authorities tend to seek resolutions to their
conflictual elements. Those conflictual elements are likely
to be brought to the parallel structure. The parallel
structure becomes a forum for the discussion of those
conflicts. The more issues in conflict in the organization,
the more political the behavior in the parallel structure. As
the parallel structure develops resolutions to those issues by
consensus, commitment to the resolutions is developed. If,
however, a true consensus is not reached, those still in
conflict will withdraw their support from the parallel
structure. The influentiality of those persons will determine
the support provided to the parallel structure and, thus, the
effectiveness of the parallel structure. [Ref 18]
(2) Business as Usual in the Command Organization.
If the parallel structure is seen as something replacing the
current command structure, it is considered a radical
departure from the current way of doing business. When change
is presented as a radical departure from the current reality,
uncertainty is created. People are more likely to become
committed to changes that do not appear to be radical
departures from their current realitj LRef 16]. Therefore,
the parallel structure, with its unique structure and internal
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operating rules, must operate parallel to the command
organization and cannot replace the command organization or
radically alter the command's way of doing business if it is
to be accepted by upper management. The degree of acceptance
amongst upper managers determines the degree of support that
will be given to the parallel structure and, thus, determines
its success [Ref 18].
b. How NCTS CONUS' TOL Structure Failed to Foster
Consensus for the Vision
The TQL structure that was developed at NCTS CONUS
had no published purpose that the organization members were
aware of. TQL was seen as something that had to be done
because it was directed. The merger was an unwelcome event
that had created tremendous uncertainty and there were basic
issues directly related to core values and command identity
that were left unresolved. No vision existed towards which
the command could work or towards which a consensus could be
built. Instead, both the command and TQL organizations sought
to reach a consensus on basic issues relating to core values
and command identity.
(1) Seeking Consensus to Conflictual Elements.
The TQL organization was developed along the formal lines of
authority within the command organization rather than along
process lines. The boundaries of the two branches of the TQL
organization reflects the territory of the person responsible
85
for the same branch or component in the command organization
The command power structure has been duplicated in the TQL
structure preserving individual territories and authorities.
This kind of defensive territorial response to the
uncertainties of creating a parallel organization is
reflective of resistance to change. Because the TQL
organization was structured the same as the command's
organizational structure, many of the same habits,
expectations, patterns of behavior and roles have been
recreated in the parallel organization. Uncertainty was
reduced by doing this and made the whole concept of a parallel
structure more understandable to some organizational members.
But in so doing, the purpose of the structure, to learn and
practice new behaviors (communication, functional interaction
and group decision making skills) not typically used in the
command organization, was lost.
The command had no common purpose or goals and
competing authorities were built into the command and TQL
structure (competing XO and TD billets) and the purpose of the
parallel TQL was obscured by territorial battles. The
parallel structure became the forum for the conflictual
elements between the organizations that had been left
unresolved from the merger (missions, funding differences,
work force composition, and different management/leadership
styles). As the QPIC began to deal with the implementation
of TQL as it related to those conflictual elements, it
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encountered the same kind of conflict that lower levels of
management would face in dealing with them. There were no
easy answers and the QPIC struggled to reach a consensus on
them.
Some early decisions regarding training and
selection of Facilitators/Trainers were made through group
consensus of at least those members present at meetings and
the decisions were, for the most part, supported by the
individual QPIC members. Those decisions made after the CO
stepped in and shut down conflict within the QPIC (e.g.,
choice of the subject for study by the first PAT, increased
weekly work time allowed for members of the AWS PAT) received
far less support from the individual members of the QPIC. The
CO's efforts to reduce the conflict in the QPIC only
heightened conflict within the command. Even though the
conflict within the QPIC was probably stressful, it had the
potential for aiding upper management in developing a
consensus on core issues that would permit the implementation
of TQL to proceed and begin laying the foundation for the
development of one command identity. When the conflict was
shut down and group decision making halted, the potential for
consensus ceased and political behaviors were continued. A
form of "TQL Gridlock" began to develop in which no right
course of action seemed apparent. Unsure of what to do next,
the QPIC did virtually nothing after all hands awareness
training was completed and the AWS PAT commissioned.
87
Without its forum, the conflict seemed to move
into the open. The entire command became aware of the
conflict and in attempts to reduce uncertainty, members of the
command began to take sides according to what they knew and
with which they felt comfortable or safe. The AWS PAT, in
particular, bore the brunt of this action. The QPIC should
have been able to reach a consensus on many of the issues
stemming from conflicts in core values. In so doing, they
would have been indirectly reconciling conflicting core values
because their decisions would have reflected the newly agreed
upon values. By forcing the conflict out of the QPIC, the AWS
PAT became the only organized entity that was recognized as
being iesponsible for collecting data on an issue rooted in
core values. The subject of AWS deals with all of the issues:
mission differences, funding differences, work force
composition and, ultimately, management and leadership styles.
These differences have their basis in core values. As long as
conflicts in core values exist, conflict within the command
will exist and the organization will seek answers to the
conflict.
Members of the AWS PAT began feeling pressure from
their peers for decisions that they did not have the authority
to make. Unable to provide answers to conflicts in core
values and unable to concentrate on the issue that caused them
to exist without full management support, the AWS PAT began to
flounder. The PAT began looking for a course of action that
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would minimize risk and uncertainty for its members. They
finally settled on administration of a survey throughout the
command in order to determine their peers' desires. This
action would reduced the uncertainties and risks that the
individual AWS PAT members faced in making future change
recommendations because there would be safety in numbers.
They would not be taking the risk of making their own
recommendations but, instead, reflecting the desires of the
entire command. The effectiveness of the PAT in learning new
behaviors and solving the problem at hand was, thus,
diminished.
(2) Radical Departures. The TQL organization at
NCTS CONUS looks like the now familiar command structure but
it feels like a radical departure from the way of doing
business because most members feel that TQL permits them to
jump the chain of command. A stable organization with clear
values and goals and no competing authorities might be able to
accept this incongruity. This command was in such turmoil
with defensive, territorial behaviors in existence that it
could not. The only values that members were sure of were
traditional military values. Now, a basic military value of
the entire organization was being challenged, the integrity of
the chain of command. While this is not the intent of TQL,
the current PIF processing procedures not only encouraged it,
they directed it. As long as this reality exists, management
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will just have one more reason for not providing full support
for TQL because of feelings of loss of control. In attempts
to deal with feelings of loss of control and uncertainty about
the loss of core values without acceptable replacements, upper
management has begun openly resisting by attempting to regain
control of PIF processing by skirting or not using the formal
PIF processing procedures. They are returning to procedures
that they know and feel safest with--the chain of command
repleat with definitive bounds of authority (territories). As
a result of the failure to use the formal PIF processing
procedures, they are beginning to see the processing
procedures as unnecessary except as they are needed to satisfy
the CO's demands. Combined with the embattled QPIC and the
TQL Gridlock that has developed, the entire concept of TQL
with its bureaucracy and its accompanying workload are
beginning to be seen as pointless.
c. Correcting the TOL Structure
Previous recommendations-establishment of common
values, norms and procedures, achievement of Critical Mass,
development of mission and vision statements--must be
accomplished before making changes to the TQL structure. The
command organization needs for the TQL organization to have a
purpose in order to accept its existence [Ref 2]. That
purpose will be based on common values, norms and procedures
[Ref 14], developed by the Critical Mass (Ref 2:p. 127], and
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driven by the mission and vision statements. Even though
there is a generic purpose for the TQL structure, each command
must identify its own reasons for developing the parallel
structure.
Since the generic purpose of the parallel TQL
organization is to provide a bounded time and place for the
learning and exercise of new behaviors, certain elements in
the structure of the TQL organization will take a predictable
form. The ESC, or QPIC, will provide for the strategic
planning of the implementation of TQL and work with customers
to determine product needs. The QMB works with the ESC to set
process oriented goals and customer specifications. The QMB
owns the processes and has the authority to examine them for
potential improvements and make changes as necessary. The QMB
works with the PATs to collect data on which decision will be
made. [Ref 6) Each component has a task and in the
performance of its task, communication, interaction between
functional groups and group decision making skills have to be
used because of the inter-relatedness of the basic TQL
organizational structure, The new behaviors that are required
for SPC are, consequently, learned. Focus on the task creates
changed behavior [Ref 12].
The QPIC needs to divest itself of the
responsibility of acting as the QMB for every PIF crossing
department lines. The QPIC's task is a strategic one. By
dual-hatting the QPIC, they have been diverted from that task
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and no one is performing it. Additionally, a blanket ruling
such as this, reduces the organization's flexibility and
increases the bureaucratic nature of the organization. QMBs
need to be formed along process lines vice lines of authority
to ensure that their focus is on task rather than territories.
The need for dual QMBs at the XO/TD level is not necessary and
actually encourages separateness rather than interaction.
These need to be disestablished. While Departmental QMBs can
most likely remain, the fact that QMBs will be created in the
future whose composition is according to processes should be
made clear. These actions will aid in shifting the focus of
the TQL organization to the necessary task orientation. In
order to accomplish the tasks, however, skill development is
required.
d. Developing the Skills to Build the Vision
(1) Skills Needed. Significant changes bring with
them the fear that the skills that were right before are no
longer right. If a change does require new skills, training
and education to build those skills are necessary to relieve
the uncertainty and, thus, reduce resistance to change. Once
training is completed, personnel need a place to practice the
newly developed skills without fear of ridicule or judgement
[Ref 16]. A trained Facilitator can guide a group in the
learning and use of new skills. The role of Facilitator
requires maturity, the ability to handle expressions of strong
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emotion and competence [Ref 15]. Rules for the internal
operations of a group can help to reduce conflict within the
group without reducing constructive discussion: one person
may speak at a time, the chair must recognize an individual
before assuming the floor, meetings will last no longer than
one hour, only agenda items will be discussed, group consensus
is required before any decision is considered final, etc. The
chair and the recorder for the meeting should be rotated
amongst all members in order to equalize power amongst all
members. [Ref 2]
The implementation of TQL brings with it the
requirement for new skills. The use of SPC requires classroom
training and application of training in order to be learned.
The application of SPC training requires new behaviors:
communication, group interaction and group decision making.
To learn new behaviors, they must be practiced. It is
unreasonable to expect personnel to read a book or attend a
class and then just implement TQL because TQL requires learned
behavior. After introduction to the concepts, the behavior
must be practiced in an atmosphere conducive to learning.
(2) NCTS CONUS' Skill Develop. The TQL training
that ipper management received only introduced them to the
concepts of TQL. There was no opportunity or time to learn
the behaviors necessary to support SPC. When NCTS CONUS
recreated their command structure with all its expectations
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and roles in the TQL structure, they did not create an
atmosphere conducive to learning because all of the same fears
and risks associated with innovative behavior that existed in
the command organization existed within the parallel
structure. The Facilitator assigned to the QPIC was the
command TQL coordinator, a mid-grade civilian unable to
facilitate group discussion that was highly charged with
emotion amongst top and upper management. No internal
operating rules were developed to support the Facilitator or
guide the group. In an effort to make sense of it all, the CO
stepped in and took charge as his training and role command
organization dictated that he should. In assuming the mantle
of authority, he made it certain that new and, therefore,
risky behaviors would not be attempted.
(3) Developing the Skills. Additional training is
necessary for upper management to refresh them since their
last training and to expand their knowledge base about TQL
beyond what they have begun to assume based on its
implementation in this dysfunctional manner. Facilitators for
the QPIC should be selected from the ranks of the Department
Heads and trained. The Facilitators chosen should be strong
personalities, mature and capable of constructively managing
conflict without discouraging discussion. More than one
person should be trained so that one person does not end up
bearing the responsibility for dealing with the strong
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emotions that are sure to surface as the group once again
attempts to reach a consensus on the issues that divide them.
Rules for the internal operations of the QPIC need
to be developed by the QPIC on how business is to be conducted
in the group. Development of the rules by the QPIC would
serve as an excellent team building exercise for the group.
The rules and the rotation of duties should remove
uncertainty from the conduct of the meetings and put everyone
on an equal footing allowing the group a forum for the free
flow of ideas without the barriers created by territorial
struggles. Rules would a±so make it clear to all on the QPIC
that there will be no central decision maker and that rather
than passively sitting by while someone else makes the
decisions, all members will be expected to participate and all
will have the opportunity to do so.
e. Develop Constancy of Purpose
(1) The Intent of Constancy of Purpose. Constancy
of purpose is required through upper levels of management to
ensure that all know and understand the organization's focus
in dealing with both short term and long term problems. A
constancy of purpose focuses on long range planning for the
organization because long range planning can reduce the
uncertainty of the future. In order to develop constancy of
purpose, the entire organization must know wherL it is headed
and have a total quality effort in place demanding planning
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and continuous process improvement. [Ref 5:p. 24-25, 98] In
other words, constancy of purpose recognizes that there will
always be occasions of crisis (special causes) but that crises
do not drive the organization; long range planning through a
total quality effort does.
(2) The Constancy of Purpose Developed at NCTS
CONUS. A constancy of purpose is spread throughout the
organization based on what management communicates to the
organization about what is important. At NCTS CONUS, the one
thing that has been communicated throughout the organization
is the importance of territories and boundaries within the
command. The territorial battles between the XO and TD are
well known throughout the command. When the TQL structure was
designed, the QMBs were defined along lines of authority
designed to protect individual territories vice being defined
along process lines. The QPIC assigned itself as the QMB for
any PIF crossing departmental lines. Obviously, not every PIF
will cross all department lines but this action ensures that
no one will be left out should a PIF inadvertently cross a
department line. The incident during the QPIC mneeting in
which one department head reported action on a PIF that was
perceived as overstepping the bounds of authority drove home
to all QPIC members the importance of individual territories.
These territorial behaviors reflects tremendous resistance to
the uncertainties of TQL.
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The only way to reduce resistance is to reduce
uncertainties. Previously recommended actions--establishment
of common values, norms and procedures, correction of the
dysfunctional command structure, achieving Critical Mass,
developing mission and vision statements, obtaining additional
TQL training and establishment of internal rules for the TQL
structure that will encourage the usage of new skills--will
help to cut down on much of the uncertainty. To cement these
words with action and communicate the new mindset to the
organization, the QPIC needs to turn its attention to
restructuring of the TQL organization as recommended. This
will send a new message through the command that focuses on
task rather than territories.
4. Spread Revitalization Throughout the Organization
Without Directing It
a. Upper Management's Role in Spreading
Revitalization
Eventually, the parallel structure and the command
organization must interact. It is possible that the
interaction between the two will result in conflict because of
their distinctly different ways of doing business [Ref 2].
The interaction may require departments to "rethink their
roles and authority in the organization" [Ref 12:p. 163].
Upper management should not direct how conflict should be
resolved and what form their department's role and authority
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will take. If upper management direct these types of things
they force their own understanding of the parallel structure
on the organization beneath them when the organization,
itself, must come to grips with its own understanding of the
parallel structure and how it fits into the department. [Ref
12] In other words, if the understanding is forced, those on
whom it is forced will feel a loss of control and react to
that loss of control by resisting the change [Ref 16]. Upper
management must lead their departments through the same change
process that they have come through first developing an
understanding of why change must occur through a joint
diagnosis of their situation, then forming a shared vision,
etc. Because the vision that they develop will be theirs,
personnel in departments will be committed to learning and
applying the new skills [Ref 12].
b. Spreading Revitalization in NCTS CONUS
The departments at NCTS CONUS have been subjected
to a lot of conflict and turmoil that created a lot of
uncertainty. They may be playing the game but for the most
part they don't truly believe that TQL is going to last beyond
the current CO. People are skeptical and that skepticism will
be very difficult to overcome.
The slowness with which the AWS PAT has proceeded
has been apparent and has built greater skepticism in the
command towards TQL. There is no way that the AWS issue can
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be dropped without building skepticism to a level that may be
unsurmountable. There are things that can be done to speed it
towards a conclusion. Originally, the QMB for the AWS PAT was
the QPIC and the AWS PAT was given no time bounds. The QPIC
should assign a QMB for the AWS PAT and working with the QMB
develop goals toward which they should be working. The QMB
can examine the AWS issue and break it down into pertinent
areas for investigation. Additional PATs could be assigned to
help collect the necessary data. This would speed the data
collection and involve other command members promoting
communication, interaction and teamwork. Each newly formed
PAT should be given specific guidelines for data presentation
and adequate time for gathering data.
Perhaps the best way to overcome the skepticism is
by simply allowing the TQL structure to work. As the QPIC
identifies customer needs, QMBs will need to be formed along
process lines. Together, the QPIC and the QMB will translate
customer needs into goals and customer specifications. The
QKB would take this information and begin examination of the
system to determine critical processes in the production of a
quality product or service for the customer and only after
identifying the most critical processes would potential
improvements to the processes become subject for discussion.
Once the potential for improvement and the need for
improvement is established, the QMB can commission a PAT to
begin to collect data on one simple, highly visible process.
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By following these general steps, the next "first"
process will be tied directly to the command's mission and
will be much easier for all to support. It will have a
greater sense of urgency to it making time bounds
understandable and important. By keeping it simple, the
purpose of group activities, learning new behaviors, can be
accomplished while still allowing group members to develop a
sense of accomplishment and pride in their work by improving
the process. The real benefit, however, will be achieved when
command personnel actually see the new philosophy at work and
skepticism will eventually begin to break down.
5. Institutionalize Revitalization
Institutionalizing or formalizing changes ensures that
changes made will continue, independent of personalities.
Timing of the formalization of changes is important to ensure
that the changes that are formalized are in fact the changes
that are desired and that the resources are available to make
the changes effective [Ref 12]. Not all changes will be
changes for the good and the organization may not want to
formalize them as they are first presented. Modifications may
be necessary. The parallel structure will make mistakes as it
learns and the command organization must allow it time to
experiment until the right answer is found. Formalizing
changes too early would result in unnecessary pressures on the
parallel structure while slowness to formalize changes could
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be interpreted as management's lack of commitment. Timing of
the formalization of changes, then, is important. [Ref 2:p.
136-137]
Many of the changes made to the command organization
and PIF processing procedures can be formalized. It may be
prudent, however, to wait before formalizing others. For
example, changes made to the TQL organization make sense in
theory but need experimentation to ensure that they are the
right move for this organization. Some may be right and
others may need adjustment. If they are formalized to early
and have to be repeatedly changed, members of the command may
react negatively to the uncertainty and confusion produced by
too frequent changes. On the other hand, changes that are
formalized too slowly, might be interpreted as being
reflective of upper management's inability or unwillingness to
support TQL. Each change must be examined prior to
formalization and a determination made as to whether or not
further experimentation is necessary. Once SPC is instituted,
changes to processes will be supported by data and the data
will indicate if further adjustments are indicated before
formalization.
6. Monitor Revitalization Efforts and Adjust Strategy as
Needed
The QPIC is the entity responsible for strategic
planning for the implementation of TQL [Ref 6:p. 5]. The QPIC
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needs to ensure that mechanisms are in place to ensure that
the implementation is continually monitored. As problems are
encountered, implementation strategies need to be adjusted
(Ref 12].
The concept of strategic planning on a continuous
basis has not been grasped by the QPIC. An attempt has been
made to evaluate the command's current situation with the
administration of the DOD Self-Assessment Survey. While that
is good and may be of some assistance in determining the
current situation, there is no strategic plan against which
the results of the survey can be compared. The QPIC should
plan to use the results of this DOD Self-Assessment Survey as
a benchmark in assessing progress in the future. In the
meantime, they should develop an implementation plan extending
well into the future.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The original intent of this thesis was to study the
implementation of TQL in a naval telecommunications
environment. NCTS CONUS was, however, in such a state of
conflict that, in order to study the implementation of TQL,
the conflict stemming from the merger had to be analyzed. The
organizational context became very important in the study of
the implementation of TQL.
Top management must consider the organizational context in
implementing TQL. If there are problems in an organization,
the implementation of TQL will only bring those problems to
the forefront. The closer the problems are to core values and
the greater the number of problems, the greater the resistance
to TQL. If top management desires to maximize the
effectiveness of TQL, then pressing organizational problems
must be resolved prior to initiating TQL or top management
must be prepared to confront the problems within the framework
of TQL.
In confronting problems within the framework of TQL, top
management must recognize that conflict is not, in itself,
negative and develop mechanisms for the constructive
management of conflict. Managed conflict allows for the
development of commitment to resolutions reached as a result
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of group consensus. Group decision making does require more
time than the authoritarian approach to decision making but,
it is the group's commitment, reached as a result of the group
decision making process, that is important.
TQL requires a team-based approach to resolving process
oriented problems. A team must have the ability to make
decisions as a group and a focus on a task in order to build
commitment for maximum effectiveness. This team-based
approach starts with top management in the joint diagnosis of
the current situation and the development of a shared vision
and a strategic plan for reaching the vision. The commitment
to the shared vision amongst top managers is developed as a
result of the group decision making process. The importance






Subj: TOTAL QUALITY LEADERSHIP (TQL)
Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 5200.31B
(b) Executive Order 12637 of 27 Apr 88
(c) OMB Circular A-132 of 22 Apr 88
d) CNO memo Ser 00/0U500214 of 13 Aug 90 (NOTAL)
(e) OPNAVINST 5450.227
Encl: (1) TQL "How to Manual" (Not Included)
1. Purpose. To implement policy for TOL within the Naval
Computer and Telecommunications Command (NAVCOMTELCON) and its
field activities.
2. Cancellation. NAVDACINST 5200.3.
3. Background. Reference (a) is the Department of Navy's {DON)
policy guidance on TOL, formerly referred to as Total Quality
Management (TQM). References (b) and (c) establish a government-
wide program to improve the quality, timeliness, and efficiency
of services provided by the Federal Government. Reference d)
establishes TQL as the approach for implementing TOM in the
Navy's operating forces.
4. Program Objectives
a. Achieve unity of purpose by all NAVCOMTELCOM military,
civilian, and contractors in executing the command's mission
stated in reference (e).
b. Develop a "quality culture" commiand-wide.
c. Establish annual TQL goals to promote the timely delivery
of high quality, cost-effective products and services command-
wide.
d. Enhance the quality of working life of the military and
civilian work force by establishing incentives, eliminating




e. Promote continuous process improvement through use of
total employee involvement.
f. Establish measures of quality to quantify organizational
improvement.
5. Discussion
a. TQL supports all improvement initiatives, such as quality
of work life, environmental responsibility, productivity
improvements, cost and schedule control, and rework reduction.
TQL focuses on continuous process improvement. The TQL strategy
is built on the basic premise that we continually seek
improvement through the creative involvement of all people. TQL
involves everyone, in an organized way, in improving what we do.
b. The TQL process includes short-range and long-range
improvement efforts. With hard work and continuous change by all
personnel, TQL will become a way of life and not just another
government program.
6. Aplicability. This guidance applies to all personnel
commd-wide.
7. Goals
a. Establish and pursue programs to improve quality and
productivity.
b. Stimulate acknowledgment of quality performance at all
levels.
c. Encourage and reward improved productivity through
employee involvement.
d. Create an atmosphere which encourages employee
involvement to meet the NAVCOMTELCOM mission of providing,
operating, and maintaining, as required, all Navy ashore
communications resources and all non-tactical information
resources for commnand, coDtrol, and administration of the Navy
and those elements of the Oefense Communications System assigned
to the Navy.
e. Develop methods to measure customer satisfaction, product
quality and timeliness to incluc identification of:





(2) Quality indicators to measure the degree to which the
output (product or service) conforms to customer requirements,
and meets or exceeds their expectations.
(3) Timeliness indicators to measure the time required to
provide the products or services.
8. Responsibilities. Commanding Officers (COs) will maintain
full responsibility for complying with all policies and actions
contained in references (a) through (d).
9. Action
a. Activity COs, NAVCOMTELCOM Headquarters Assistant Chiefs
of Staff, and special staffs will:
(1) Ensure continuous, obvious, top level commitment to
the TQL process strategy.
(2) Ensure TQL strategies are addressed in activity
and/or Headquarters' program and planning guidance, and that
adequate resources are allocated to support these issues.
(3) Take steps to promote continuous process improvement,
productivity measurement, evaluation, and action as an integralpart of planning and management systems. The improvement of
productivity is an inherent and continuing responsibility of all
managers.
(4) Ensure the TQL organization is in place, i.e.,
Executive Steering Committee (ESC), Quality Management Boards(QMBs) and Process Action Teams (PATs).
(5) Establish and implement PATs composed of a cross-
section of employees to resolve problems at the activity. Each
team should have sufficient authority to take positive action to
improve the process or resolve the problem(s). See enclosure (1)
for guidance in establishing PATs.
(6) Take action to expand productivity measurement to allproducts and services provided to internal and external
customers.
(71 Implement TQL training that ensures adequate training
for all employees. Enclosure (1) contains minimum TOL training
requirements.
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(8) Implement an Ideas Handling Program that places
emphasis on employee participation. Ensure that ideas are
tracked monthly as to the number received and number implemented.
The results of the Ideas Handling Program should be displayed
within the activity. Visibility of results of the program will
encourage employees to participate.
(9) Ensure quality is included in all supervisors'
performance evaluations.
b. Commander, Naval Computer and Telecommunications Command
will:
(1) Establish a claimancy Executive Steering Committee
(ESC), formerly known as the Quality Productivity Improvement
Council (QPIC).
(2) Provide overall TQL guidance and advice.
(3) Monitor and evaluate TQL progress and measure
performance trends.
(4) Ensure uniformity in evaluation and interpretation of
TQL statistics for purposes of reporting or determining resource
requirements.
(5) Evaluate TQL information and provide feedback to
field activities and headquarters staff.
(6) Consolidate activity TQL progress submissions and
report quarterly to the Office of the Under Secretary of the Navy
for TOM/Productivity on NAVCOMTELCCM progress. Prepare special
TQL reports as requested.
10. Conclusion. Crucial to the success of the DON's TQL strategy
is top ma-agement leadership, employee participation, and a long-
term commitment to continuous improvement. Activities' ESCs will
fully support the DON TOL guiding principles:
We will accomplish the mission.
We recognize the central fact that our Sailors and Marines
are the best prepared and that our units have the highest rates
of operational readiness in ouc history. They are at the heart
of our ability to perform the mission. We must maintain that
quality.
We are all responsible for accomplishing the mission. That
is our first loyalty. We must strive to find new ways to
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cooperate within the DON which look beyond a single service
warfare community or traditional role and responsibility. Pride,
professionalism and a sense of community are extremely important
but we must ensure that they are not rigid barriers to our inter-
operability. The valuable process of competing for resources and
roles must not be carried to divisive and destructive extremes.
We accept responsibility for taking control of and improving
all the systems and processes through which we support Sailors
and Marines. We can ensure that the weapons, ammunition,
training, transport, health care, housing and all other goods and
services which constitute that support are of predictable high
quality and available on time and in sufficient quantity for any
task they may be called upon to perform.
We must use innovation to meet current and future require-
ments and challenge ourselves to develop creative methods,
including new technologies, to enhance our support to our
operating forces.
We are committed to honesty and integrity, recognizing that
the public trust and defense of the nation require the highest
standards of moral conduct. By integrity we mean that we will
make decisions which are in the best interests of the Navy, the
Marine Corps and the nation without regard to personal
consequences.
we have adopted the term Total Quality Leadership (TQL) as
the general term under which we will pursue total quality
efforts. However, we understand that it is the concepts and
content of those efforts that is important--not what they are
called.
11. Reports. Commanding Officers will comply with reporting
requirements listed below:
a. A quarterly report of TQL accomplishments is due to
NAVCOMTELCOM Code NlA on the first of December, March, June,
and September. These reports will be consolidated and forwarded
quarterly to the Under Secretary of the Navy for TOM/Productiv-
ity.
b. Quarterly reports should be in narrative form and cover
the status of the Productivity Gain Sharing Program, Value
Engineering Program, the Productivity Enhancing Incentive Fund
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(PEIF) program, TQL training, suggestions, employee incentive
programs and other TOL accomplishments.
K. .LAUGHTOt4
Distribution List:




FG6 (Commuinication Area Master Stations)
FG9 (Headquarters Navy-Marine Corps MARS Radio Station)
FG10 (AUTODIN Switching Center)
FL4 (Navy Regional Data Automation Centers)







1. What do you find most stimulating about TQL?
a. Why do you think that it was decided to implement TQL?
b. How did you decide what your first step would be in
implementing TQL in your department? (Department
Heads) ... in this command? (CO, XO, TD)
c. What did you expect from TQL in the beginning?
d. How has TQL met your expectations?
2. What has been most challenging about putting TQL into
effect? ... in the implementation process so far?
(Department Heads, CO, XO, TD)
a. What kinds of problems did you anticipate in
implementing TQL? (Department Heads, CO, XO, TD)
b. How did you plan to overcome those problems?
(Department Heads, CO, XO, TD)
c. How were the problems that you anticipated the same as
or different from those you experienced? (Department
Heads, CO, XO, TD)
d. Can you generally isolate the paygrade or group of
people who have had the most difficulty understanding
TQL? (Department Heads, CO, XO, TD)
Ii
e. What has been hardest for others?
f. What would have helped?
g. What has been easiest?
h. How do people behave differently now that you have
TQL?
3. How did you see your role in the implementation process?
a. What personal or professional benefits/rewards exist
for you to cause you to want to participate in TQL?
4. TQL takes a lot of time and money to implement. How has
that effected you and your work center? ... your
department? (Department Heads) ...this command? (CO,
XO, TD)
a. What benefits have you experienced so far?
b. How does TQL effect the way you do your job?
5. How have (and what) events and actions outside your work
center affected the use of TQL?
a. What support do you need to make TQL successful in
your work center? ... your department? (Department
Heads) ...your command? (CO, XO, TD)
b. What do you see that needs to be done that nobody else
understands?
c. What would you like to see happen to help others to
understand?
d. What would you do (or like to see done) differently if
everything could start over?
6. What are you accomplishing with TQL?
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a. What do you expect from TQL now that you've had some
experience with it?
b. What is the most positive thing that has happened with
TQL?
7. What one thing would you like for me to understand about
this command and TQL?
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APPENDIX C
THE TQL IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS
17 December 1990: CO's memo, Attachment 1, distributed to
all hands introducing definition of TQL, key conceptual
elements of TQL, PDCA cycle, Benefits of TQL,
costs/requirements of success with TQL, Barriers to
transformation, and strategies for successful implementation.
03 January 1991: CO's memo, Attachment 2, distributed to
all hands globally defining TQL and introducing concept of an
activity credo.
January 1991: Training for QPIC members presented by
Quality Alert Institute, Inc.
06 February 1991: First QPIC meeting held. TD absent.
Meeting chaired by a Department Head. TQL Organization
approved. Format for command TQL newsletter approved.
11 February 1991: First TQL newsletter published.
Related establishment of QPIC and Newsletter. Discussed
communications and Quality Improvement Cycle.
12 February 1991: CO's memo, Attachment 3, to all hands
summarized QPIC meeting minutes, provided TQL Organizational
Structure and billet descriptions for TQL organizational
positions.
20 February 1991: QPIC meeting held to address training
of more organization members in preparation for roles as on-
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site TQL Facilitators and Trainers. TD absent. Meeting
chaired by a Department Head. TQL vendors reviewed and
decision made to stay with Quality Alert Institute. Nominees
for Facilitator and Trainers made. Decided that Trainers will
also serve as Facilitator.
05 March 1991: QPIC meeting held. Chaired by Department
Head. Facilitators (five) and Trainers (four) selected. "Go-
slow approach" adopted in implementation process.
12 March 1991: QPIC meeting held. Chaired by Department
Head. High cost of Facilitator/Trainer training discussed.
Decided to poll other commands for more participants. TQL
organization responsibilities and Implementation Process
package reviewed. PAT meetings/activities limited to one hour
per week. All Hands Awareness training agreed to be scheduled
over several months. Format of Productivity Improvement
Forms (PIF) discussed.
19 March 1991: QPIC meeting held. TD absent. Meeting
chaired by CO. Facilitator/Trainer training schedule
approved. Awareness training set for July time frame. Draft
of PIF submitted for individual review and comment.
22 March 1991: Newsletter published list of personnel
selected for TQL Facilitator/Trainer.
23 April 1991: QPIC meeting held. TD absent. Meeting
chaired by CO. Facilitator/Trainer schedule promulgated. CO
requested to meet with Facilitator/trainers prior to training.
Format for Productivity Improvement Forms (PIF) approved.
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Schedule for TQL Awareness Training approved. Distribution of
TQL Notice planned for 01 Jul 91.
01 May 1991: Newsletter published list of TQ books
available for check out. Discussed role of QMB and PAT.
14 May 1991: QPIC meeting held. TD absent. TQL Training
quantified at $4500/hr revenue lost. Proposed NCTS Notice
distributed for review. First Process for study was
tentatively approved to be Alternative Work Schedules (AWS)
with QPIC acting as QMB.
28 May 1991: QPIC meeting held. TD absent. AWS as first
process to study was approved. Department Head selected to
meet one on one with QPIC members to get input for selecting
participants and setting bounds for PAT. Training of remote
sites discussed.
18 June 1991: QPIC meeting held. TD absent. Charter for
PAT assigned to Department Head for development. TQL
Coordinator to pull together AWS information package for PAT.
01 July 1991: Newsletter published first process selected
for study and PAT members' names.
12 July 1991: QPIC meeting held. TD absent. Membership
of PAT published. PAT's draft charter presented for review.
13 August 1991: QPIC meeting held. CO absent. Meeting
chaired by XO. Discussion on EIG, PIF tracking, NCTS CONUS
TQL Instruction and PAT's charter.
23 August 1991: QPIC meeting held. TD absent. Awareness
Training Feedback discussed. Process for handling
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Productivity Improvement Form finalized. Notification
requirements for formation of other PATs established. AWS PAT
meeting hours increased to two hours/wk. Requirement for Dept
Directors to notify TQL Coordinator of membership of EIGs and
QMBs disclosed.
31 August 1991: NCTS CONUS TQL Instruction published,
Attachment 4.
01 September 1991: Newsletter published Bravo Zulu to
Trainers on design of curriculum for all hands Awareness
Training and completion of training of all personnel. PIF
submission and process procedure published.
02 October 1991: QPIC meeting held. QMB and EIG
memberships reviewed. Remote site processing of PIFs
established. PIF tracking system discussed. Action on PIFs
submitted from throughout command discussed. PAT established
to examine check in/out procedures. NCTC TQL Instruction
reviewed. Other possibilities for PAT efforts suggested and
discussed.
01 November 1991: Newsletter published membership of QMBs
and EIGs as well as AWS PAT update.
05 November 1991: QPIC meeting held. TD absent.
Distribution of DOD Quality and Productivity Self-Assessment
Survey discussed. Statms of PIFs reviewed and will be posted
on E-Mail Bulletin Board and POD. Statistical Process Control
video planned for next meeting.






Subj: TOTAL QUALITY LEADERSHIP (TQL)
1. TQL is coming, and I need your help and support to gain benefits from it.
TQL supports ALL improvement inttiat--es, Such-as quality of work life,
process improvements, rework reduction and improved customer service. TQL -
focuses on continuous process management with a strategy of
continually seeking improvement through the creative invol -ant of ALL
personnel,
2. The most important aspect of this crucial effort is support from the top.
And let me assure you, both ADM Tuttle and CAPT Laughton are strong supporters
of TQL. I am on board and ready to lead a team effort. Let's make it happen
together.
3. Obviously, this eflort will not be completed overnight. We need to
recognize that this will be a LONG-TERM commitment which will take time to
Jmplement fully. We will be starting shortly with awareness and "how-to"
training. Stay tuned.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY eg,,mO
3 January 1991
From: Corwanding officer
SubJ: TOTAL QUALITY LEADERSHIP (TQL) #2
Encl: (1) Activity TQM Credo
1. TQL is a strategy for continuous improvement of work processes and to enhance
the quality of service and products we provide our customers (whoever they may
be). The principles of TQL embrace doing the right things, and doing then right
the first time. TQL encourages the participation of all employees: to foster a
quality focused environment.
2. As such, the principles of TQL (or TQ) can be implemented in an activity.
Enclosure (1) is a TQV- Credo for an Ounnamed activity". With the Range of only
a few words, this could just as well be ours. I intend to establish our own
"Credo". Be thinking about what it should be.
3. By the way, any guesses on who this mystery activity is?
Distribution:
List B, List C
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TQI I CREDO
MISSION: To improve continually our products and services to meet our
customers' needs, allowing us to prosper as a business.
VALUES: People. Our people are the source of our strength. They provide
our corporate intelligence and determine our reputation
and vitality. Involvement and teamwork are our core
human values.
Products. Our products are the end result of our efforts, and
they should be the best in serving customers worldwide.
As our products are viewed, so are we viewed.
Profits. Profits are the ultimate measure of how efficiently we
provide customers with the best products for their needs.
Profits are required to survive and grow.
GUIDING PRINCIPLES:
Quality comes first. To achieve customer satisfaction, the quality of
our products and services must be our number one priority.
Customers are the focus of everything we do. Our work must be done with
our customers in mind, providing better products and services than our
competition.
Continuous improvement is essential to our success. We must strive for
excellence in everything we do; in our products; in their value, and in
our services, our human relations, our competitiveness and our
profi tabi lity.
Employee involvement is our way of life. We are a team. We must treat
each other with respect and trust.
Dealers and supplies are our partners. We must maintain mutually
beneficial relationships with dealers, suppliers and other business
associates.
Integrity is never compromised. The conduct of our company worldwide
must be pursued in a manner that is socially responsible and commands
respect for its integrity and for its positive contributions to society.
Our doors are open to men and women alike without regard to ethnic








Subj: TOTAL QUALITY LEADERSHIP (TQL) #4
Enc: (1) TQL Organizational Structure
(2) TQL Terminology
1. The first Quality/Productivity Improvement Council (QPIC) meeting was
conducted on 6 February 1991. A summary of the minutes is as fclows:
a. A TQL organization chart was presented and approved, a copy of which is
enclosure (1).
b. The following TQL formal training is still to be conducted:
(1) QPIC - 1 day
(2) Facilitator
(3) Trainer
(4) All Hands Awareness
c. Nominees for Facilitators and Trainers will be presented at the next
QPIC meeting 20 February.
d. A draft of The Quality newsLetter was presented and approved.
2. Enclosure (2) is a brief description of the TQL terms you have been hearing.
They will be more fully covered in the when it is
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Employee Involvement Group (EIG) - A group of individuals acting as a
team to identify issues, problems or processes requiring improvement.
These teams may be grouped by function or organization and should be
comprised of no more than 10 people. The processes in need of
improvement and accompanying ideas identified by the EIG will be
forwarded to the QMB for action via the supervisory chain of command.
An EIG may be permanent, rearranged or combined with other EIGs as
the situation dictates.
TQL Facilitators - In house personnel selected and trained to serve
as consultants to the various QMBs and PATs.
TQL Trainers - In house personnel selected and trained to train
employees in TQL Awareness and PAT and QM procedures.
TOL Coordinator - This individual monitors, plans, and collects
information about progress, assists with administrative arrangements,
or whatever else may be needed to ensure implementation activities
continue. The TQL coordinator is responsible for implementation of
policy and operational initiatives pertaining to the overall TQL
effort.
Performance Action Team (PAT) - The team is comprised of individuals
working on a specific issue, problem or process. The teams are
specifically formed to address a particular concern, and will
dissolve on completion of their work.
Quality Management Boards (WNs) - These boards represent all
organizational levels and are linked by their senior members who are
core members and stakeholders in the process. They provide the
organizational structure that will eliminate friction between
organizational units, and enable the use of group problem solving
techniques. QMBs are permanent groups; they do not dissolve after
problems are solved, but oversee continual process improvement.
Quality/Productivity Improvement Council (OPIC) - QPIC is chaired by
the Commanding Officer and is composed of top level management
representitives, and representitives of each department head. The
QPIC will develop TQL philosophy and policy; develop a plan for TQL
implementation; provide resource support; and identify and prioritize
initial projects.
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Subj: TOTAL QUALITY LEADERSHIP (TQL)
Encl: (1) 'roductivity Improvement Form (PIF)
1. Purpose. To disseminate information regarding Total Quality Leadership(T L7.
2. Background. TQL is a strategy for continuous improvement of work processes
and to enhance the quality of services and products we provide our customers.
The principles of TQL espouse doing the right things, and doing them right the
first time. The use of TQL will enhance our ability to execute our mission,
improve the allocation of resources, produce quality services and products,
measure the quality of those outputs, and increase customer satisfaction. TQL
encourages the participation of all personnel to foster a quality focused
culture within the Navy. Simply put, TQL is teamwork. It allows the
flexibility of turning a commitment into action, then into a result.
3. Definitions.
a. Quality/Productivity Improvement Council (QPI:) - The QPIC is made up of
the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Technical Director, Department
Directors, Command Master Chief, and TQL Coordinator. The primary role of the
QPIC is to provide support and advice to the Command TQL Facilitators, Trainers,
and the Quality Management Boards (QMBs). The QPIC will also assess all command
policies and procedures for consistency with the quality improvement effort.
b. Quality Management Board (QMB) - QMBs consist of department/division
supervisors and other designated personnel. QMBs are permanent r3ups; they do
not dissolve but oversee continual process improvement.
c. Process Action Team (PAT) - PAT members are assigned by QMBs. The
membership consist of a leader, personnel involved in the process being reviewed
and a TQL Facilitator, as necessary. The personnel are chosen for their
expertise and functional responsibility. PATs are assigned specific process(es)
and should be provided specific improvement goals by the QMB.
d. Employee Involvement Group (EIG) - EIGs consist of no more than ten
people grouped by function or organization. An EIG may be permanent, rearranged
or combined as the situation dictates. The EIGs *brainstorm", seeking ideas
that may be TQL process candidates.
e. TQL Facilitators - In-house personnel selected and trained to serve as
consultants to the various PATs and QMBs.
f. Productivity Improvement Form (PIF) - The PIF (Enclosure (1)) is the




a. Commanding Officer will:
(1) Promote the continuous process, productivity measurement,
evaluation, and action as an integral part of planning and management systems.
(2y Establish and implement employee recognition incentives that
motivate employee participation in TQL efforts.
(3) Chair the QPIC.
(4) Ensure continuous top level commitment to the TQL process strategy.
b. Executive Officer and Technical Director will:
(1) Chair the respective Command QMB for the departments under their
cognizance.
(2) Serve as members of the QPIC.
c. Department Directors will:
(1) Serve as members of the QPIC.
(2) Evaluate TQL information and provide feedback to personnel.
(3) Chair their respective Department QMB.
(4) Designate personnel to serve on the Department QB and EIG groups.
(5) Serve on the appropriate Command QMB.
(6) Ensure approved PIFs are in compliance with the Collective
3argaining Agreement.
(7) Provide the Commanding Officer with departmental TQL status on a
weekly basis.
d. Division Directors/Branch Heads/Supervisors will:
(1) Serve on the Department QMB as designated.
(2) Foster internal and external communication in their areas to affect
process improvement.
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e. Personnel will:
(1) Serve on a PAT, EIG, or QMB as designated.
(2) Promote continuous process improvement through the use of total
employee involvement.
f. QPIC will:
(1) Communicate policy and assist in prioritizing quality issues when
multiple and/or conflicting quality issues are identified by comnand groups.
(2) Develop communication links to keep all hands informed.
(3) Assume responsibility for and assign Process Action Teams (PATs) to
issues which cross command organization lines.
(4) Ensure actions taken on PIFs are in compliance with the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
(5) Review all actions taken on PIFs.
g. Command/Departmental QMBs will:
(1) Review PIFs as applicable.
(2) Form a PAT when necessary and be responsible for its performance.
In this capacity the Department QMBs will:
(a) Provide all necessary support for the PAT, its members, and its
action.
(b) Provide a written statement of task.
(c) Advise the PAT of any special controls or constraints, i.e.,
statutory regulations.
(d) Require regular status briefs from PATs.
(e) Require PATs to gather data (if appropriate).
(f) Require recommendations and supporting data from PATs in
writing.
(g) Act on PAT recommendations, or provide written reasons why
recommendations cannot be adopted.
(h) Implement Statistical Process Control (SPC) wherever possible.
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(i) Provide status briefs to the QPIC.
(j) Provide final PAT results to QPIC.
(k) Dissolve the PAT when its mission is complete.
(31 Notify the TQL Coordinator in the event a Facilitator and/or Trainer
is required for the PAT.
h. PATs will:
(1) Evaluate systems and processes, and gather data. This data is
analyzed to evaluate the system/process and measure improvement as changes are
implemented.
(2) Provide status briefs to the QMB.
(3) Provide findings and recommendations to the QMB.
(4) Follow-up corrective action, gather additional data, and report
improvements to the QMB.
i. EIGs will:
(1) Act as a team to identify potential processes for improvement.
(2) Serve as a point of contact for personnel to communicate potential
process for improvement during staff meetings.
j. TQL Facilitators will:
(1) Act as TQL consultants to both QMBs and PATs.
(2) Help the PAT leader ensure total group participation, team building,
good organization, use of pertinent analytical tools, and recognition for the
group.
(3) Ensure TQL meetings remain focused and in keeping with the TQL
process.
k. TQL Coordinator will:
(1) Monitor, plan, and collect information about progress and assist
with administrative arrangements to ensure implementation activities continue.
(2) Be on the distribution list for minutes of all QMB meetings, all
formal PAT reports, and other internal or external correspondence that is TQL
related.
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(3) Serve on the QPIC.
(4) Receive and serialize all PIFs.
(5) Ensure TQL information and PIF submissions are publicized.
(6) Be notified by the QMB in the event a PAT is formed and a
Facilitator and/or Trainer is required.
(7) Submit quarterly and annual reports to COMHAVCOMTELCOM as required.
5. Productivity Improvement Form:
a. The PIF will be submitted and processed as follows:
(1) Personnel will submit the PIF to the TQL Coordinator. The PIF can
be submitted anonymously, however it must contain a division code.
(2) The TQL Coordinator will assign a serial number and forward it on to
the cognizant Department Director.
(3) The Department Director will take appropriate action or refer to the
Department QMB.
(4) The Department QMB will take appropriate action, form a PAT, or
refer to the Command QMB if the process crosses department lines.
(5) The Command QMB will take appropriate action, form a PAT, or forward
on to the QPIC.
(6) The QPIC will be the final reviewing body.
(7) The Department Director will inform the submitter of action taken
and provide recurring status.
b. Productivity Improvement Form,
enclosure (I), will be stocked in the Personnel Services Division (N13) and will







:1. To submit a productivity improvement idea to be studied for possible implementation:
aL Complete the Productivity Imtprovement Form dutiugi Part V, arid
b. Submit the completed form to the TQL Coordinato.
III. Process Short Tide:__________________ ___________
The proposed idea will (check as many as apply):
Z Reduce Labor Cost Improve Product Qualit)
Z Reduce Supply Cost DReduce Maintenance Cost
2improve Office Procedures Reduce Equipment Cost
Z: Improve Customer Satsaction M Save Enery
2Miscellaneous Explain:
I. Explain the current process and its problems. Explain proposed improvement. (Attach additional sheets or
sketches as necessar)
IV. If submitted under the Beneficial Suneston or MLCAP Piopam
Dow: umtber
V. Submined W. Divda.
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VL Depanment Director Acton: Date:
Accept nRefer to pt QMM 0 NIA
C Decline C Furte Study Required
Reason(s):
VI. Department QMB Action: Date:
0 Accept Refer to Command QMB
- Furte Study Required C Decline
Rasoo(s):
VIM. Command QMOB Action: Dote:
C Accept 0 Futhe Study Required C Dechne
Rewoos):
IX. QIC Review: Dwe:
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